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1 
Condemning Clothes: 
The Constitutionality of Taking 
Trademarks in the Professional Sports 
Franchise Context 
Mitchell D. Diles* 
Abstract 
The resurgence in franchise free agency in the National 
Football League (NFL) potentially implicates the loss of a 
significant source of local identity and tradition for multiple 
cities. In January 2016, NFL owners approved the relocation of 
the Rams franchise from St. Louis, Missouri, to Los Angeles, 
California, by a vote of thirty-to-two. The owners’ vote also 
potentially implicates the relocation of the San Diego Chargers 
and the Oakland Raiders. Though applauded by numerous sports 
commentators, athletes, and fans, the vote reflects the failure of 
negotiations between the City of St. Louis and the Rams 
organization. The approval also sets the stage for a new 
generation of controversies over valuable team property. This 
includes disputes over team logos and other trademarks. 
Although cities and fans may appear helpless when faced 
with franchise relocation, one powerful, although rarely invoked, 
point of leverage for local governments is the threat of exercising 
eminent domain power. In theory, this action could prevent a team 
from relocating. During the 1980s and 1990s, efforts to prevent 
professional sports franchises from moving, which included 
condemnation proceedings initiated by multiple cities, largely 
failed. Given the current, broad interpretation of the public use 
                                                                                                     
 *  Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 
2017. I am eternally grateful to Professor Christopher Seaman for inspiring this 
Note and for his constant guidance and feedback. I would also like to thank the 
Washington and Lee Law Review editorial boards for their thoughtful edits and 
suggestions. Finally, thank you to my parents, David and Suzanne, for their 
enduring love and support in all my endeavors. I owe all my success to them. 
2 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016) 
language in the Takings Clause, however, it is unclear whether 
another eminent domain action could succeed. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether an eminent domain action could seize a moving 
franchise’s trademarks given the “propertization” of trademarks 
and other forms of intellectual property. 
This Note examines whether a city could exercise its eminent 
domain powers to acquire the intangible intellectual property 
rights associated with a professional sports franchise, specifically 
a team’s trademarks and associated goodwill. In doing so, it 
examines the unresolved issue of whether trademarks constitute 
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If trademarks constitute 
constitutionally protected private property, the Fifth Amendment 
provides users of the mark with enhanced protection against 
government seizures. In the context of professional sports 
franchises, this would give teams greater protection upon 
relocation. 
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I. Introduction 
As Jerry Seinfeld famously explained, sports fans cheer for 
clothes.1 In many respects, he is right. The clothes represent a 
particular brand—the city, the franchise’s history, and a prized 
form of entertainment.2 Essentially, a professional sports team 
and the clothes its players wear symbolize the franchise’s home 
community.3 Teams help give their fans a sense of belonging and 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See Seinfeld: The Label Maker (NBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 1995) 
(discussing the phenomenon of fan loyalty to any one sports franchise, 
regardless of the players for that team). According to Seinfeld’s observations, 
“[l]oyalty to any one sports team is pretty hard to justify, because the players 
are always changing, the team could move to another city. You’re actually 
rooting for the clothes when you get right down to it.” Id. Often, he notes, “[f]ans 
will be so in love with a player, but if he goes to another team, they boo him.” Id. 
 2.  See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 672 (4th ed. 2010) 
(describing the desire of fans to identify with a favorite franchise or athletic 
organization, which results in the purchase of items ranging from hats to jerseys 
to pennants “that carry a team name, nickname, team player name or number, 
logo, or symbol of the organization”). 
 3.  See Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports 
Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing 
Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing 
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something to believe in, something to look forward to, and 
something that they take pride in.4 Though athletes and coaches 
come and go, the franchise remains.5 
 In the context of professional sports, trademarks protect a 
franchise’s exclusive interest in the names, colors,6 logos, and 
symbols fans associate with the team.7 For any company in a 
competitive market, the ability to capture the attention of 
consumers is an invaluable asset.8 The same is true for sports 
teams.9 With the help of trademarks, the clothes players wear 
create an identifiable image through which a team promotes its 
products and services.10 Considering the increase in popularity of 
professional sports and modern sports marketing, trademark 
licensing is a growing, multi-million dollar industry.11 
                                                                                                     
Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 59 (1997) (discussing the relationship between a 
professional sports franchise and its host city in the context of franchise 
relocation). 
 4.  See id. (explaining the effect of a professional sports franchise on its 
host community). 
 5.  See id. (observing that professional sports franchises often become 
“deeply ingrained in the local identity” of their host communities). 
 6.  See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) 
(holding that trademark protection may extend to a single color). 
 7.  See WONG, supra note 2, at 665 (illustrating the additional revenue that 
sports teams earn by licensing their trademarks). 
 8.  See Dannean J. Hetzel, Professional Athletes and Sports Teams: The 
Nexus of Their Identity Protection, 11 SPORTS L.J. 141, 143 (2004) (commenting 
on the value of identity for any professional athlete or sports franchise). 
 9.  See id. (showing the increase in value and popularity of sports 
franchises over the years). 
 10.  See WONG, supra note 2, at 665–66 (describing the primary, historical 
purposes underlying a sports franchise’s trademark, and the emergence of 
trademark licensing as a significant revenue source for teams); Hetzel, supra 
note 8, at 142 (noting that “[p]rofessional . . . sports teams generate millions of 
dollars each year using their popularity to sell products and services”). 
 11.  See Mark S. Nagel & Daniel A. Rascher, Washington “Redskins”-
Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and Economic Issues 
Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 789, 796 (2007) (commenting on the recent trend among professional sports 
teams in “releasing multiple versions of their uniforms, hats, and other licensed 
merchandise to enhance revenues by capitalizing on their trademarks and 
logos”); Sean H. Brogan, Who Are These “Colts?”: The Likelihood of Confusion, 
Consumer Survey Evidence and Trademark Abandonment in Indianapolis Colts, 
Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 39, 39 
(1996) (illustrating “how professional football is experiencing a sharp increase in 
competition for valuable trademarks”). 
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Consequently, professional sports leagues and teams vigorously 
protect their trademarks and associated goodwill from 
infringement.12 
The increase in value of professional sports franchises 
parallels the growing popularity of professional sports in 
general.13 Taking both tangible and intangible property rights 
into consideration, estimates value professional sports franchises 
in the hundreds of millions, and even billions, of dollars.14 
Although difficult to quantify, the intangible intellectual property 
interests associated with a professional sports franchise add 
substantial value and marketability.15 As Seinfeld might put it, a 
big chunk of the value of sports teams is fans cheering for 
clothes.16 
Unfortunately for some fans, the potential for franchise 
relocation is a reality among professional sports leagues.17 In 
particular, a team may engage in “franchise free agency”18 when 
                                                                                                     
 12.  See WONG, supra note 2, at 665 (describing how professional sports 
leagues and franchises often initiate lawsuits to retain exclusive trademark 
rights). Related to trademarks, goodwill, as defined by one court, is “the 
favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to 
emanate from a particular source.” See White Tower Sys. v. White Castle Sys. of 
Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) (enjoining a junior user who 
substantially appropriated a trade name, advertising slogan, and building type 
of another in the same business with established goodwill). 
 13.  See Kurt Badenhausen, The World’s 50 Most Valuable Teams 2015, 
FORBES (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/07/15/the-worlds-50-most-
valuable-sports-teams-2015/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (ranking the world’s 
fifty most valuable sports franchises, which include twenty National Football 
League (NFL) franchises, twelve Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises, and 
ten National Basketball Association (NBA) franchises) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14.  See id. (describing that, on average, the world’s fifty most valuable 
sports teams are worth an estimated $1.75 billion). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (introducing the 
phenomenon of sports fans cheering for clothes). 
 17.  See Brogan, supra note 11, at 40 (referring to the underlying financial 
interests that influence a professional football team’s desire to relocate). 
 18.  Originally coined by former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle, the term 
refers to the competition among cities to attract major league teams. See Don 
Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law 
as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1067–72 (2004) (detailing the phenomenon of franchise free 
agency). Traditionally, the term “free agent” refers to a player without a 
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requesting or demanding certain benefits from local and state 
governments, such as tax-free financing for new stadiums.19 
Fearful of angry fans and other consequences of relocation, local 
politicians regularly capitulate to these demands.20 Additionally, 
some politicians contend that granting these benefits, like new 
stadiums, will provide new employment opportunities and spur 
economic development.21 
Although teams may appear to hold most of the cards in 
relocation, one powerful, although rarely invoked, point of 
leverage for local governments is the threat of exercising eminent 
domain power22 to seize the franchise.23 In theory, this action 
                                                                                                     
contractual obligation to play for any particular team. Id. at 1067 n.4. The 
absence of any obligation permits that player to negotiate with his former team 
and other interested teams until a satisfactory deal is reached. Id. Similarly, a 
franchise free agent is a team that shops for a new home and a superior 
situation. Id. 
 19.  See Michael Colangelo, Teams Continue to Use Relocation Threat as 
Leverage, FIELDS OF GREEN (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://thefieldsofgreen.com/2014/12/22/chargers-rams-raiders-relocation-kings-
patriots-venues/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (asserting that the threat of 
relocation to obtain financial benefits is not a new practice among professional 
sports franchises) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20.  See Mitten & Burton, supra note 3, at 58 (mentioning the cultural 
truism that any community’s most visible and cherished asset is its local 
professional sports franchise). 
 21.  The perceived public benefits from hosting a professional sports 
franchise include enhanced reputation and prestige, additional job 
opportunities, increased sales and use taxes, new recreational opportunities, 
and enhanced civic pride and youth interest in sports. Id. at 60 n.6. Most 
economists, however, present a skeptical view that utilizing public funds to 
support a professional sports franchise contributes to economic growth. See, e.g., 
Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums 
Worth the Cost?, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1997), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-taxes-noll (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2016) (concluding that sports teams and facilities are not a 
source of local economic growth and employment and that public support of 
professional sports is a poor investment decision) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). For a more in depth discussion of the economic impact of 
professional sports franchises on local economies, see generally SPORTS, JOBS 
AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger G. 
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (exploring the appropriate methods for 
measuring economic benefits derived from professional sports franchises and 
including case studies of major league sports facilities in various markets). 
 22.  Eminent domain, in its broadest sense, is the power of government to 
take property for public use without the owner’s consent, provided that the 
owner receive just compensation. See Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW 
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could prevent a team from relocating.24 There are numerous legal 
issues involved with the exercise of eminent domain in this 
context, however, many of which have not been fully explored.25 
Among these is whether a professional sports team’s trademark 
can be seized as part of a franchise.26 If successful, cities could 
avoid a significant loss of local identity and tradition.27 
This Note examines whether a city could exercise its eminent 
domain powers to acquire the intangible intellectual property 
rights associated with a professional sports franchise, specifically 
                                                                                                     
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining eminent domain as “[t]he inherent power 
of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and 
convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club 
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving “the attempt of the Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore to condemn a professional football team—
formerly the Baltimore Colts, and now doing business as the Indianapolis 
Colts”); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) 
(concerning the City of Oakland’s eminent domain action to acquire the property 
rights associated with ownership of the Raiders professional football team as a 
franchise member of the NFL). 
 24.  See Thomas W. E. Joyce, III, The Constitutionality of Taking a Sports 
Franchise by Eminent Domain and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict 
Franchise Relocation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 553, 553–96 (1984) (exploring the 
constitutionality of public use, just compensation, right to travel, and Commerce 
Clause limitations as applied to the taking of sports franchises by eminent 
domain following the City of Oakland’s unsuccessful attempt to seize the 
Oakland Raiders franchise). 
 25.  See id. at 596 (concluding that eminent domain is not an appropriate 
method in preventing the relocation of sports franchises); see also Charles Gray, 
Note, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1329–72 (1986) 
(discussing the potential limitations on a city’s ability to condemn a sports 
franchise, the impact of the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution on the 
exercise of eminent domain, the potential restriction of the right to travel that 
might result from a sports franchise taking, and antitrust implications); Greg L. 
Johnson, Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV): Commerce 
Clause Scrutiny as an End-Run Around Traditional Public Use Analysis, 1 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 335, 335–61 (1987) (examining whether the Public Use Clause can be 
legitimately extended to a sports franchise). 
 26.  See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property 
Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 536 (1998) (noting that the 
vast majority of Supreme Court decisions regarding the Takings Clause concern 
actions initiated in response to government takings of real, as opposed to 
personal or intangible, property). 
 27.  See Brogan, supra note 11, at 73 (arguing that the increasing exodus of 
professional sports franchises from their host cities “sets the stage for future 
trademark disputes over valuable team logos and other trademarks”). 
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a team’s trademark and associated goodwill. Such property rights 
are critical to the identity of sports teams and their host 
communities. To address that question, this Note considers the 
broader question of whether trademarks constitute 
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Understanding the scope of 
trademark law and its intersection with takings jurisprudence 
helps clarify the property interests associated with trademarks 
and the degree of protection those interests receive. 
Part II summarizes historical disputes regarding franchise 
relocation to introduce the possibility that a city could exercise its 
eminent domain powers to seize a moving team’s trademark 
rights.28 It then reviews the NFL’s recent approval of the Rams 
franchise to relocate to Los Angeles, California.29 Part III 
explains the legal background necessary for understanding the 
issues surrounding the Takings Clause and its application to 
intangible intellectual property rights, including trademarks.30 
Part IV provides a brief overview of the four major categories of 
intangible intellectual property rights—trade secrets, patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks—and how the private property 
interests of each differ.31 Part V proceeds in two stages: First, it 
evaluates the unresolved issue of whether trademarks constitute 
constitutionally protected private property under the Takings 
Clause.32 Second, it argues that trademarks should be considered 
constitutionally protected private property.33 Part VI concludes 
that trademarks are constitutional private property interests to 
                                                                                                     
 28.  See infra Part II.A (describing the relocation of four NFL franchises 
during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as their consequences). 
 29.  See infra Part II.B (illustrating modern franchise free agency in the 
NFL). 
 30.  See infra Part  III (discussing the historical justifications for the 
Takings Clause, its jurisprudence, and its application to forms of property other 
than real property). 
 31.  See infra Part IV (differentiating between the four major categories of 
intellectual property and the bundle of rights associated with each). 
 32.  See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the arguments against treating 
trademarks as private property rights and contemporary judicial guidance, 
which future courts would likely apply to the trademark taking issue). 
 33.  See infra Part V.C (concluding that, based on recent judicial guidance 
and the propertization of trademarks and other forms of intellectual property, 
trademarks should be considered constitutionally protected private property). 
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professional sports franchises but ultimately determines that the 
taking of a team’s trademark could constitute a valid public use.34 
II. Franchise Relocation: The NFL as a Case Study 
This Part discusses franchise relocation as an ongoing issue, 
using the NFL as a case study. It first summarizes historical 
disputes regarding franchise relocation in the NFL in the 1980s 
and 1990s.35 It then addresses the NFL’s recent decision to 
permit the Rams franchise to move from St. Louis, Missouri, to 
Los Angeles, California.36 
A. The 1980s: Oakland and Baltimore 
During the 1980s, two cities went to court to prevent their 
teams from relocating.37 Both the City of Baltimore and the City 
of Oakland attempted to take title to their local NFL teams 
through the exercise of eminent domain power.38 In addition to 
other arguments, the cities asserted that the condemnation of a 
professional sports franchise qualified as a valid public use.39 
                                                                                                     
 34.  See infra Part VI (concluding that, even with heightened constitutional 
protection under the Takings Clause, the seizure of a relocating professional 
sports franchise’s trademark could constitute a valid public use). 
 35.  See infra Part II.A (discussing relocation disputes arising in the cities 
of Oakland and Baltimore in the 1980s, and in the cities of Cleveland and 
Houston in the 1990s). 
 36.  See infra Part II.B (explaining that, presently, multiple cities face 
relocation dilemmas created by franchise free agency). 
 37.  See infra Part II.C (summarizing condemnation proceedings initiated 
by the cities of Oakland and Baltimore in an attempt to block the relocation of 
two professional football franchises). 
 38.  See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders I), 176 Cal. Rptr. 646, 
647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (representing the first wave of litigation resulting from 
the City of Oakland’s attempt to condemn the Raiders franchise), vacated sub 
nom., 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore 
Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving the City of 
Baltimore’s attempt to seize the Colts franchise following their infamous 
midnight move to Indianapolis, Indiana). 
 39.  See Jonathan N. Portner, Comment, The Continued Expansion of the 
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 542, 548–51 
(1988) (examining the evolution of the public use requirement of the Takings 
Clause and its influence on sports franchises). 
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This subpart discusses the events preceding the disputes and the 
judicial resolution of both controversies.40 
1. Oakland Raiders v. City of Oakland 
The first example of a city’s attempt to seize the property 
rights associated with the ownership of a professional sports 
franchise occurred almost four decades ago.41 In 1980, Oakland 
Raiders owner Al Davis announced his intention to move the 
franchise to Los Angeles, California.42 In the years leading up to 
the announcement, the franchise recorded thirteen consecutive 
sellout seasons.43 Soon after the announcement, the City of 
Oakland filed an eminent domain action to acquire the property 
rights associated with the ownership of the Raiders as a franchise 
member of the NFL.44 
                                                                                                     
 40.  See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing the litigation following the 
relocation of the Raiders and Colts franchises and the various judicial decisions 
reached). 
 41.  See Raiders I, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (concluding that California law did 
not authorize the condemnation of the Raiders franchise), vacated sub nom., 646 
P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982). 
 42.  “In 1966, the Raiders and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc., 
a nonprofit corporation, entered into a five-year licensing agreement for use of 
the Oakland Coliseum by the Raiders.” See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837 
(describing the contractual agreement between the Raiders franchise and the 
City of Oakland). The contract included five three-year renewal options. Id. The 
Raiders exercised the first three renewals, but failed to negotiate a fourth 
extension for the 1980 season. Id. 
 43.   See Sanjay Jose’ Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency 
and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 20 (1996) (noting 
that part of the agreement reached between Al Davis and the City of Los 
Angeles included “a luxury box package of unshared revenue amounting to over 
three times what Oakland could offer,” which, subsequently, generated 
significantly more revenue for the franchise). 
 44.   See Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) (summarizing that the 
Raiders argued that the law of eminent domain did not permit the taking of 
intangible property and that the City of Oakland could not establish a valid 
public use). The Oakland relocation controversy also resulted in antitrust 
litigation. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F. 2d 1381, 1384–86 
(9th Cir. 1984) (describing the background and facts of the lawsuit). One week 
after Al Davis’s announcement, league owners voted unanimously against the 
move under Rule 4.3 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. See id. at 1385 
(“[T]he NFL teams voted . . . 22–0 against the move, with five teams 
abstaining.”). The rule requires an affirmative vote of three-fourths from 
franchise owners to approve relocation. Id. In response, Al Davis, joined by the 
CONDEMNING CLOTHES 11 
In the original lawsuit, Raiders I, the Superior Court granted 
the Raiders franchise summary judgment and dismissed the 
action with prejudice.45 The trial judge found that “no essential 
public use to an eminent domain action could be found, and [that 
the City] lacked the authority to exercise eminent domain for the 
purpose of keeping the Raiders’ franchise in Oakland.”46 The 
appellate court affirmed the decision.47 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court determined that 
the trial court erred in granting the Raiders franchise summary 
judgment.48 Therefore, it reversed and remanded the case back to 
the trial court.49 In reaching its conclusion, the court considered 
two major issues: (1) whether the law of eminent domain permits 
the taking of intangible property,50 and (2) whether the public use 
requirement permitted the taking of a professional sports 
franchise.51 
Addressing the first issue, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that, “[f]or eminent domain purposes, neither the 
federal nor the state Constitution distinguishes between property 
                                                                                                     
Los Angeles Coliseum, sued the NFL. Id. They claimed that Rule 4.3 violated 
section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act by unlawfully restraining trade. Id. 
Hearing the case on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the NFL violated federal antitrust laws by attempting to block 
the move, allowing the Raiders franchise to move to Los Angeles. Id. at 1401. In 
a subsequent lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit held the NFL liable for treble damages 
that totaled approximately $50 million. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. 
NFL, 791 F. 2d 1356, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming a trebled damage verdict in 
favor of the Los Angeles Coliseum but vacating the Raiders’ antitrust damage 
recovery). 
 45.  See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837 (“The City of Oakland . . . appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing with prejudice . . . .”). 
 46.  See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 555 (quoting the unreported decision of 
the lower court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 837 (considering whether a sufficient factual 
controversy existed to warrant a trial on the merits). 
 49.  See id. (“We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the 
summary judgment and we reverse and remand the case for a full evidentiary 
trial of the issues on the merits.”). 
 50.  See id. at 837 (noting that the Raiders characterized the property rights 
associated with the franchise as a “network of intangible contractual rights”). 
 51.  See id. (adding that the Raiders also argued that the public use 
requirement did not encompass the City of Oakland’s proposed action). 
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which is real or personal, tangible or intangible.”52 Regarding the 
public use issue, the court determined only “that the acquisition 
and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an 
appropriate municipal function.”53 However, the court explicitly 
stated its refusal to decide the merits of the City of Oakland’s 
condemnation claim.54 Instead, the court instructed the trial 
court to determine whether a valid public use justified the City of 
Oakland’s eminent domain action on remand.55 
The case moved between the trial and appellate court levels 
for the next three years.56 During that time, the Raiders relocated 
and played their home games in Los Angeles.57 But, after years of 
litigation and appeals, the California Court of Appeals entered 
judgment for the Raiders on final remand.58 The court based its 
decision on three independent grounds: (1) the Public Use 
Clause, (2) federal antitrust laws, and (3) the Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.59 
In its opinion, the final Raiders court (Raiders IV) first 
addressed the trial court’s determination that the Commerce 
Clause of the federal constitution invalidated the City of 
Oakland’s action.60 It noted that years of precedent established 
                                                                                                     
 52.  Id. at 840. 
 53.  Id. at 843. 
 54.  See id. at 845 (“[W]e do not decide whether [the] City has a meritorious 
condemnation claim in this case.”). 
 55.  See id. (noting that the City of Oakland’s “ability to prove a valid public 
use for its proposed action” remained untested). 
 56.  See City of Oakland v. Superior Court (Raiders II), 186 Cal. Rptr. 326, 
329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (granting the City of Oakland’s request for a writ of 
mandate requiring the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
application to reinstate the preliminary injunction); City of Oakland v. Superior 
Court (Raiders III), 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing the 
trial court, again, and remanding the case for further hearings on several issues, 
including whether the taking served a public use), appeal filed, 220 Cal. Rptr. 
153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
 57.  See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1076 n.62 (mentioning that the 
Raiders franchise moved back to the City of Oakland in 1995). 
 58.  See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV), 220 Cal. Rptr. 
153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the City of Oakland’s attempted 
seizure of the Raiders franchise violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
 59.  See id. at 155 (describing that, on remand, the trial court again entered 
judgment for the Raiders franchise based on three independent grounds). 
 60.  See id. (“We turn first to the trial court’s commerce clause 
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“that a state may exercise eminent domain power even though by 
so doing it indirectly or incidentally burdens interstate 
commerce.”61 But the court accepted the Raiders contention that, 
because professional football is a nationwide business, the seizure 
of a franchise by eminent domain would constitute an undue 
burden on interstate commerce.62 This burden outweighed any 
state interest in enforcing its antitrust laws against the Oakland 
Raiders franchise.63 
The court’s conclusion on the Commerce Clause and antitrust 
issues signaled defeat for the City of Oakland.64 Regardless, the 
court engaged in a short discussion of an essential question facing 
any challenge to an eminent domain action: whether the taking 
constituted a valid public use.65 The City of Oakland alleged that 
its reasons for condemnation—which included the promotion of 
public recreation, social welfare, and related economic benefits—
satisfied the public use requirement.66 The court disagreed, 
finding the City of Oakland’s arguments unpersuasive.67 Though 
presumptively legitimate, local interests did not outweigh the 
foreseeable burdens on interstate commerce.68 
                                                                                                     
determination.”). 
 61.  Id. at 156. Stated another way, a state’s exercise of eminent domain 
violates the Commerce Clause if it impermissibly burdens or affects interstate 
commerce. Id. 
 62.  See id. at 156–57 (“Plaintiff’s proposed action would more than 
indirectly or incidentally regulate interstate commerce . . . [t]his is the precise 
brand of parochial meddling with the national economy that the commerce 
clause was designed to prohibit.”). 
 63.  See id. at 157 (“Fragmentation of the league structure on the basis of 
state lines would adversely affect the success of the competitive business 
enterprise, and differing state antitrust decisions if applied to the enterprise 
would likely compel all member teams to comply with the laws of the strictest 
state.”). 
 64.  See id. at 158 (“Our conclusion on the commerce clause obviates the 
need for further consideration of the public use and antitrust arguments.”). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See id. (noting that the City of Oakland desired “to best utilize the 
stadium in which the Raiders played”). 
 67.  See id. (characterizing the City of Oakland’s public use claims as 
presumably legitimate but less compelling). 
 68.  See id. (“[T]he burden that would be imposed on interstate commerce 
outweighs the local interest in exercising statutory eminent domain authority 
over the Raiders franchise.”); see also infra Part VI.A (discussing the 
precedential value of the public use determination in the Raiders litigation). 
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2. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 
The Raiders cases signaled the beginning of the modern 
franchise free agency era in professional sports.69 Moving 
forward, courts characterized NFL franchises as business 
enterprises rather than agents of their host cities.70 Taking 
advantage of the precedent set by the Raiders organization, 
multiple franchises demonstrated an interest in relocation—
among them, the Baltimore Colts.71 
Beginning in late 1983 and early 1984, Baltimore Colts 
owner Robert Irsay entered into extensive negotiations with the 
mayor of Baltimore, William Donald Schaefer, to address the 
terms of his stadium lease.72 Among other things, the discussions 
included the possibility of constructing a new stadium to replace 
the aging Baltimore Memorial Stadium.73 When negotiations 
failed to produce an agreement, Irsay explored the possibility of 
relocating the Colts to Indianapolis, Indiana.74 
Faced with the prospect of losing the Colts, on February 24, 
1984, the Maryland State Senate introduced a bill to amend the 
City of Baltimore’s charter.75 The proposed legislation authorized 
                                                                                                     
 69.  See Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in 
the National Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 493–95 (1997) 
(summarizing franchise free agency’s harm to professional sports leagues). 
 70.  See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(characterizing the Raiders franchise as a “competitive business enterprise”). 
 71.  See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985) (involving an eminent domain action 
initiated by the City of Baltimore following the relocation of the Colts franchise 
to Indianapolis, Indiana). 
 72.  See id. (discussing the events leading to the City of Baltimore’s attempt 
to condemn the Colts franchise). 
 73.  See Philip B. Wilson, Thirty Years Later, Remembering How Colts’ Move 
Went Down, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/colts/2014/03/29/indianapolis-
baltimore-move-30-year-anniversary-mayflower/7053553/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2016) (describing Irsay’s dissatisfaction with the outdated Memorial Stadium 
and declining fan attendance at home games) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 74.  See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 624 F. Supp. at 279 (noting that 
the Mayor of Indianapolis organized a control group comprised of local 
politicians and businessmen to negotiate with the Colts organization in the hope 
of persuading the franchise to relocate). 
 75.  Id. 
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the city to condemn the franchise if the need arose.76 At the same 
time, the Colts entered into extended negotiations with “the 
Capital Improvements Board of Managers of Marion County, 
Indiana (“CIB”), the owner of the Hoosier Dome, concerning the 
possibility of a lease of the Dome to the Colts.”77 
On the morning of March 27, 1984, the Maryland State 
Senate passed this emergency legislation.78 Hearing of the news 
the following day, Irsay immediately decided to move the Colts 
franchise.79 He instructed Michael Chernoff, vice-president and 
general counsel of the Colts, to “conclude the Hoosier Dome 
lease . . . [and] move all the Colts’ property from Owings Mills, 
Maryland, to Indianapolis immediately.”80 
Fearing an imminent eminent domain action, moving 
personnel worked through the night of March 28, 1984, to load all 
of the Colts’ physical property into the now infamous “Mayflower 
moving vans.”81 Departing under the cover of darkness, a convoy 
of moving vans left the Colts’ training complex loaded with most 
of the team’s office and athletic equipment.82 Their destination: 
Indianapolis.83 
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland legislature enacted 
Emergency Bill No. 1042, the legislation that authorized the City 
                                                                                                     
 76.  See id. (describing that news of the bill’s introduction, which occurred 
on February 24, 1984, quickly reached the Indianapolis control group). 
 77.  Id. In contrast to the Oakland Raiders relocation controversy, the NFL 
stated “that it would take no action with respect to any possible move of the 
Colts.” Id. at 280–81. The announcement was made in the wake of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in the antitrust lawsuit from the Raiders litigation, which was 
released on February 28, 1984. See supra note 44 and accompanying text 
(summarizing the antitrust litigation triggered by the Raiders’ relocation 
controversy, which resulted in treble damages against the NFL). 
 78.  See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 278, 280 (D. Md. 1985) (explaining that city officials continued to 
negotiate a financial package with the Colts franchise to persuade the team to 
stay in Baltimore). 
 79.  See id. (adding that Isray learned of the Maryland Senate’s emergency 
legislation “from a Chicago newspaper account”). 
 80.  See id. (“Chernoff and the Indianapolis officials executed a twenty-year 
lease and the corresponding loan agreement the same day.”). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See id. (“By the morning of March 29, 1984, the Mayflower [moving] 
vans were on their way to Indianapolis.”). 
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of Baltimore to condemn sports franchises.84 Under the new 
legislation, the city immediately filed a condemnation petition in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.85 The Colts later removed 
the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.86 
Ultimately, the district court invalidated the condemnation.87 
First, the court addressed the failure of the City of Baltimore to 
make any compensation payment.88 According to Judge Walter E. 
Black, Jr., the City of Baltimore had no right to restrict the owner 
of a professional football franchise from moving the team beyond 
the state’s jurisdiction except through payment of 
compensation.89 The mere filing of the condemnation petition did 
not automatically bestow the City of Baltimore with rights over 
the franchise.90 Of course, as Judge Black noted, it is “axiomatic 
that a sovereign state’s power to condemn property extends only 
as far as its borders.”91 With the Colts principal place of business 
no longer in Maryland, the court determined that the City of 
Baltimore’s jurisdictional reach did not extend to the franchise.92 
Consequently, the court invalidated the City of Baltimore’s 
exercise of eminent domain.93 
                                                                                                     
 84.  See id. (adding that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore enacted a 
secondary piece of legislation, which also authorized condemnation). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 281. 
 87.  See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (describing the reasons 
for the court’s conclusion that the City of Baltimore lacked the power to 
condemn the Colts’ franchise). 
 88.  See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 278, 283 (D. Md. 1985) (explaining that the relevant provisions of 
the Maryland Constitution explicitly prohibited the legislature from seizing 
private property until paying or tendering just compensation). 
 89.  See id. (concluding that the relevant provisions of the State of 
Maryland’s statutory scheme clearly provided that no taking is valid “until 
compensation is paid to the owner or to a court”). 
 90.  See id. (“The City has at no time made any payment of the 
compensation that would be required, and, as a result, it had no power to stop 
Irsay from treating his property as he wished.”). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See id. at 287 (finding that the applicable laws of eminent domain did 
not provide a remedy for the City of Baltimore and that, in the courts words, 
“the Colts were ‘gone’ on March 30, 1984”). 
 93.  Id. The court did not engage in a public use analysis because the Colts 
prevailed on the “threshold issue of the appropriate date for determining the 
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B. The 1990s: Cleveland and Houston 
As previously mentioned, cities and fans may refuse to let 
their teams leave them completely empty-handed upon 
relocation.94 This was the case during the Cleveland Browns 
relocation controversy of 1995.95 On November 6, 1995, Cleveland 
Browns owner Arthur “Art” Modell announced that the city’s 
beloved NFL franchise would move to Baltimore, Maryland, for 
the 1996 season.96 Outraged, the City of Cleveland filed a breach 
of contract claim against the Browns to enjoin Modell from 
relocating the team.97 In addition, the City filed a trademark suit 
to prevent the Browns’ name from leaving if Modell succeeded in 
relocating the team.98 The complaint focused on the history and 
                                                                                                     
situs of the franchise.” Id. 
 94.  See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1081–89 (discussing “what rights 
fans or cities have in a team’s name, colors, and records”). 
 95.  Both the Rams and Raiders franchises also relocated from Los Angeles, 
California, during the 1990s. See infra note 118 and accompanying text 
(describing the NFL’s exodus from the Southern California market following the 
1994 regular season). 
 96.  See Charles Babington & Ken Denlinger, Modell Announces Browns’ 
Move to Baltimore, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 1995), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/sports/longterm/memories/1995/95nfl4.ht
m (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (announcing Art Modell’s plans to move the 
Cleveland Browns franchise to Baltimore and describing possible impediments 
to the move) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). At the time of 
the announcement, the Browns franchise occupied a sixty-four-year-old stadium. 
See Nottingham, supra note 18, at 1069 (describing the economic health of the 
Browns franchise in 1995). Although the City recently built Jacobs Field, a 
brand new stadium for the Cleveland Indians, the Browns were unable to 
convince voters to approve funding for another new stadium. Id. But, in 
exchange for relocating the Browns franchise, Baltimore offered Modell “a new 
stadium, rent-free for seven years, in addition to all revenue from all one 
hundred eight luxury boxes, 7500 box seats, parking, and in-stadium 
advertising.” Id. Baltimore also paid the Modell’s moving expenses. Id. 
 97.  See Alvin B. Lindsay, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The 
Trademark Rights of Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 915, 
917–18 (2000) (describing that the breach of contract claim arose out of terms in 
the franchise’s stadium lease). 
 98.  See id. at 946 (noting that “The City of Cleveland’s Lanham Act 
complaint brought civil actions for unfair competition, wrongful registration, 
and misappropriation of trade name and mark designations of origin”). Fans 
and local politicians also took other steps to prevent the Browns franchise from 
relocating following Modell’s announcement. Id. at 918. Fans formed 
organizations to protest the move and held numerous rallies. Id. Cleveland 
mayor Michael R. White “hosted a conference of U.S. mayors aimed at arming 
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tradition of the Browns in Cleveland since the franchise’s 
founding in 1945.99 It also alleged an inseparable connection 
between the City of Cleveland and the Browns’ trademarks.100 
Unfortunately for the City of Cleveland, its efforts did not 
prevent “The Move”101 from occurring.102 Extensive negotiations 
between the Browns, the NFL, and officials from both cities, 
however, resulted in a settlement that kept the franchise’s legacy 
in Cleveland.103 The deal permitted Modell’s team to leave for 
Baltimore, but the team name, colors, and records remained in 
Cleveland for a new Browns franchise.104 
The Cleveland Browns relocation controversy of 1995 is the 
most recent example of a city’s attempt to obtain the intangible 
intellectual property rights associated with a relocating NFL 
franchise.105 A similar legal battle did not ensue when Houston 
                                                                                                     
communities to protect themselves against franchise free agency.” Id. Ohio 
Senator John Glenn even “introduced a bill to give the NFL a limited antitrust 
exemption to vote to block such moves.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99.  See id. at 946–47 (summarizing the history of the Browns franchise in 
Cleveland). 
 100.  See id. at 946 (characterizing the registered trademarks of the Browns 
franchise as being “inseparably connected in the minds of consumers, 
particularly with reference to the market for professional football”). 
 101.  See BOB DYER, THE TOP 20 MOMENTS IN CLEVELAND SPORTS: 
TREMENDOUS TALES OF HEROES AND HEARTBREAKS 277–91 (2003) (ranking “The 
Move” as the third most sensational event in Cleveland sports history). 
 102.  See id. (describing the events leading up to the Browns’ relocation to 
Baltimore, Maryland). 
 103.   See Mullick, supra note 43, at 21–22 (analyzing the deal reached 
between the NFL and the City of Cleveland in the wake of the team’s 
relocation). 
 104.  See id. at 22 (“The NFL then pledged to help finance the construction of 
a new football stadium in Cleveland within three years and guaranteed 
Cleveland a football team for the 1999 season.”). Additionally, Modell agreed to 
pay the City of Cleveland $12 million in damages over four years. See Leone, 
supra note 69, at 476 (arguing that congressional action is necessary to protect 
the interests of cities and fans from self-interested owners who relocate sports 
franchises after accepting local or federal subsidies or public financing for 
stadium construction, renovations, or other services). 
 105.  Even though the City of Cleveland did not initiate an eminent domain 
action against the Browns franchise, the controversy is nonetheless significant 
in illustrating the efforts that a city may take to prevent a professional sports 
franchise from relocating. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text 
(describing multiple legal actions initiated by the City of Cleveland to prevent 
the Cleveland Browns franchise from relocating, which included a trademark 
suit). 
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Oilers owner Bud Adams moved his team to Nashville, 
Tennessee, before the 1997 season.106 After relocating, the team 
played as the Oilers for its first two seasons in Tennessee.107 
During the 1998 season, however, the franchise announced its 
intention to forge a new identity as the Tennessee Titans.108 At 
the same time, NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue agreed to 
retire the Oilers nickname and trademark.109 The decision 
prohibited any future team from taking the name and allowed the 
new Titans franchise to retain the history, traditions, and records 
of the Oilers.110 
After being deserted by its former team, the City of Houston 
was awarded the thirty-second NFL franchise in late 1999.111 The 
newly minted Houston Texans played their inaugural NFL 
season in 2002.112 
The relocation of the Browns and Oilers franchises followed 
two different paths and resulted in two different outcomes.113 
                                                                                                     
 106.  See Leone, supra note 69, at 486 (“Nashville lured the Oilers from 
Houston with a promise of a $292 million stadium with 65,000–70,000 seats, 
120 luxury suites, and 12,000–14,000 premium club seats.”). 
 107.  See CBSNews.com Staff, Oilers Change Name to Titans, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 14, 1998), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oilers-change-name-to-titans/ 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (noting that Tennessee fans did not initially embrace 
the Oilers, who played their first season in the City of Memphis and their 
second in Nashville’s Vanderbilt Stadium) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 108.  See id. (describing the process of deciding upon a new nickname for the 
franchise, which included input from prominent state officials and business 
executives). 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 97, at 915 (mentioning that the 
decision to retire the Oilers’ nickname received some backlash from prominent 
members of the Houston community, including “legendary Oilers coach Bum 
Phillips”). 
 111.  See id. (revealing that the City of Houston defeated the City of Los 
Angeles to obtain the honor of becoming the host city of the newest NFL 
franchise). 
 112.  See Bradley J. Stein, How the Home Team Can Keep from Getting 
Sacked: A City’s Best Defense to Franchise Free Agency in Professional Football, 
5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 7 (2003) (“[T]he city of Houston was awarded an 
expansion franchise by the NFL to ‘compensate’ the city for the loss of the 
Oilers.”). 
 113.  See Leone, supra note 69, at 503–04 (arguing that the Oilers move 
seemed more justified than other relocations because the team remained in 
Houston until the end of its lease obligation, efforts to keep the team garnered 
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While a substantial amount of conflict characterized the Browns’ 
relocation, the efforts of the City of Cleveland resulted in a small, 
albeit significant, victory.114 The City of Houston, in contrast, did 
not threaten the Oilers with legal action aimed at blocking the 
franchise from moving.115 Considering the history of franchise 
relocation in the NFL since the beginning of the franchise free 
agency era, this is somewhat surprising.116 
C. The 2010s: Return to Los Angeles 
On January 12, 2016, the NFL confirmed its return to Los 
Angeles, California.117 The second largest city and television 
market in the United States, Los Angeles has not been home to a 
professional football team in over twenty years, since both the 
Raiders and Rams departed for Oakland and St. Louis 
respectively.118 Though the NFL periodically considered a return 
to Los Angeles, multiple efforts ultimately stalled.119 However, in 
                                                                                                     
little fan support, and, at the time, the stadium was over thirty years old). 
 114.  See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (describing the result 
of negotiations between the Browns, the NFL, and officials from both cities). 
 115.  See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (explaining events 
that transpired after the relocation of the Houston Oilers franchise). 
 116.  See supra Part II.A (discussing eminent domain actions filed against 
the Raiders and Colts franchises to prevent their relocation). 
 117.  See Nick Wagoner, Rams, Chargers, Raiders File with NFL for 
Relocation to Los Angeles, ESPN (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14505636/st-louis-rams-san-diego-chargers-
oakland-raiders-file-los-angeles-relocation (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting 
on the relocation applications of the Oakland Raiders, San Diego Chargers, and 
St. Louis Rams to relocate to Los Angeles, California, which were filed following 
the end of the 2015 regular season) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 118.  Both the Rams and Raiders relocated from Los Angeles, California, 
following the 1994 NFL season. See Rams Headed Back to Los Angeles; Chargers 
Have Option to Join, ESPN (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14558668/st-louis-rams-relocate-los-angeles (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2016) (discussing the relocation of the Rams organization to Los 
Angeles, California, for the 2016 NFL season) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). The Rams moved to St. Louis, Missouri, and the Raiders went 
to Oakland, California. Id. Though the Rams organization was founded in 
Cleveland, Ohio, the franchise resided in Los Angeles, California, from 1946–
1994. Id. During that time period, the team earned twenty-one playoff 
appearances and one NFL title. Id. 
 119.  See id. (“For more than two decades, billionaire developers, corporate 
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accordance with the NFL’s Policy and Procedures for Proposed 
Franchise Relocations, three franchises filed applications for 
relocation following the 2015 regular season.120 One team, the St. 
Louis Rams, proposed building a domed stadium in Inglewood, 
California, which could also house a second franchise.121 
Alternatively, the Oakland Raiders and the San Diego Chargers 
proposed building an outdoor stadium together in Carson, 
California.122 
After vetting by various committees, including the NFL’s 
Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities,123 League officials 
                                                                                                     
titans, Hollywood power-brokers[,] and four Los Angeles mayors tried and failed 
to bring the National Football League back to the nation’s second-largest 
market.”). 
 120.  See Around the NFL Staff, Rams, Chargers, Raiders Apply for L.A. 
Relocation, NFL (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000617813/article/rams-chargers-
raiders-apply-for-la-relocation (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting that, in 
accordance with the NFL’s relocation policies, three teams submitted 
applications to move to Los Angeles) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 121.  In January 2014, Rams owner Stan Kroenke acquired approximately 
sixty acres of land in Inglewood, California, for an estimated $101 million. See 
Sam Farmer & Nathan Fenno, NFL Will Return to Los Angeles for 2016 Season, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-la-
chargers-rams-20160113-story.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting on the 
NFL’s approval of the Rams’ relocation and numerous behind the scenes efforts 
to send a team back to Los Angeles) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The property is adjacent to 238 acres of land owned by San Francisco-
based developer Stockbridge Capital Group. Id. A year after Kroenke’s land 
purchase, the Los Angeles Times reported that Kroenke and Stockbridge 
Capital Group partnered to build a new NFL stadium on the Inglewood property 
owned by Kroenke. Id. Developers envision transforming the entire 298-acre site 
into a “multibillion-dollar entertainment, retail[,] and housing complex.” Id. The 
entire project will be privately financed, with the “stadium and a performing 
arts venue as the centerpiece.” Id. 
 122.  See id. (noting that the Rams’ relocation and stadium proposal faced 
competition; the Chargers and Raiders proposed to build a $1.7 billion stadium 
on 157-acres in Carson, California). 
 123.  Commissioner Roger Goodell formed the Committee on Los Angeles 
Opportunities in January 2015 to “evaluate the various stadium options 
available in Los Angeles, oversee the application of the relocation guidelines in 
the event that one or more clubs seek to move to Los Angeles, ensure proper 
coordination with other standing committees . . . and confirm that all steps 
taken in Los Angeles are consistent with the Constitution and Bylaws and NFL 
policies.” See Dan Hanzus, NFL Forms Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities, 
NFL (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000469646/article/roger-goodell-forms-
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slated the relocation proposals for a final vote.124 On January 12, 
2016, the NFL’s thirty-two owners accepted the Rams’ proposal 
by a vote of thirty-to-two, allowing the franchise to relocate to Los 
Angeles for the 2016 season.125 The vote also gave the “San Diego 
Chargers a one-year option to join the Rams in Inglewood.”126 If 
the Chargers forfeit their option to join the Rams by January 15, 
2017, the Raiders will have a one-year option to move to 
Inglewood.127 While franchise owners applauded the outcome,128 
the move reflects the failure of negotiations between the City of 
St. Louis and the Rams organization.129 
                                                                                                     
committee-on-la-opportunities (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (reporting on a memo 
sent to all thirty-two NFL franchises, notifying owners of the committee’s 
formation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The committee 
consisted of six franchise owners, including Clark Hunt, Robert Kraft, John 
Mara, Bob McNair, Jerry Richardson, and Art Rooney. Id. 
 124.  See Ken Belson, A Primer on the N.F.L. Relocating a Team to Los 
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/sports/football/nfl-los-angeles-relocation-
vote-oakland-san-diego-st-louis.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) 
(explaining the role of the NFL’s Committee on Los Angeles Opportunities in 
vetting the proposals for relocation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 125.  Id. According to the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws, relocation 
approval requires an “affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member 
clubs of the League.” See CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 
art. IV, § 3 (rev. 2006), 
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/issues/footballstadium/nflfranchiserel
ocationrules.pdf (outlining the basic requirements for franchise relocation). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See Jim Thomas, NFL Owners Thrilled by Kroenke’s Move, ST. LOUIS 
DISPATCH (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/football/professional/cowboys-owner-jerry-jones-
exults-in-rams-relocation/article_09762b03-a87e-5c6b-a9fa-250bb46450ae.html 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (quoting Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas 
Cowboys, who called the approval of the move “absolutely the greatest plan that 
has ever been conceived in sports”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 129.  See Belson, supra note 124 (mentioning efforts by the cities of Oakland, 
St. Louis, and San Diego to prevent their teams from relocating). 
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D. What Does This Mean for Modern Franchise Free Agency? 
Presently, the City of St. Louis faces the same dilemma once 
confronted by the cities of Oakland and Baltimore in the 1980s, 
and the cities of Cleveland and Houston in the 1990s.130 The 
terms of the NFL’s relocation vote in January 2016 also 
potentially implicates the cities of San Diego and Oakland.131 
With multiple NFL franchise relocations resulting in significant 
controversy, the present situation begs the question: Will cities 
faced with franchise relocation take measures to protect the 
community’s interests? If so, by what means? 
After the Oakland and Baltimore litigation, no other city has 
attempted to seize an NFL franchise by eminent domain.132 While 
the courts ruled against the cities of Oakland and Baltimore, it is 
unclear whether another eminent domain action would succeed 
given the expansion in takings jurisprudence.133 Moreover, it is 
unclear whether an eminent domain action could seize a moving 
franchise’s trademarks given the propertization of trademarks 
and other forms of intellectual property.134 
                                                                                                     
 130.  See supra notes 117–127 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
approved relocation of the Rams franchise from St. Louis, Missouri to Los 
Angeles, California). 
 131.  See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
NFL’s vote permitting the Rams to move to Los Angeles also gives the San 
Diego Chargers a one-year option to join the Rams in Inglewood, which is then 
extended to the Oakland Raiders if the Chargers remain in San Diego). 
 132.  See Leone, supra note 69, at 506 (describing the inability of a city to 
protect its interests from franchise free agency). 
 133.  See Ellen Z. Mufson, Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible 
Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 
389–411 (1984) (describing historical uncertainty surrounding the question of 
whether intangible property may be seized by eminent domain); see also 
Portner, supra note 39, at 548–51 (examining the status of the public use 
requirement and applying it to sports franchises). 
 134.  A significant development in takings jurisprudence involves the 
widening of the public use language in the Takings Clause to encompass takings 
that transfer private property from one owner to another for a public purpose, 
which occurred two decades after the courts struck down the eminent domain 
actions of Oakland and Baltimore. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 489 (2005) (describing the deference given to legislative determinations of 
public use). 
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III. The Takings Clause and Intangible Property Rights 
This Part provides an overview of general takings law and its 
applications.135 It then discusses the implications of extending the 
Takings Clause to personal property under Horne v. Department 
of Agriculture.136 Lastly, it considers the underexplored issue of 
whether the Takings Clause encompasses intangible intellectual 
property rights, including trademarks.137 
A. A Short History of the “Public Use” Requirement 
The final clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states, “[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”138 The Takings Clause 
bars the “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”139 
James Madison, the drafter of the Fifth Amendment, 
recognized the ability of the political majority to suppress 
minority groups and feared the power of government.140 Prior to 
independence, eighteenth-century colonial legislatures took 
                                                                                                     
 135.  See infra Part III.A–B (summarizing the history of the Takings Clause 
and its jurisprudence). 
 136.  See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2435–33 (2015) 
(concluding that the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just 
compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes “real” 
property); infra Part III.C (explaining the Court’s rationale). 
 137.  See infra Part III.D (discussing the implications of the Court’s decision 
in Horne for intellectual property rights). 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 139.  See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (involving a 
shipbuilder’s default on its contract to construct certain boats for the United 
States, and where the government, exercising an option under the contract, 
required the shipbuilder to transfer to the government title to the uncompleted 
boats and the materials on hand for their construction). 
 140.  See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708–13 
(1985) (explaining that, because James Madison believed that the right to 
property was a manifestation of positive law, erecting strong safeguards for 
property rights was of critical importance); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 
370 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that “government is 
instituted no less for the protection of the property, than of the persons of 
individuals”). 
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private property without providing any compensation to the 
owner.141 Embracing the emerging ideals of liberalism, Madison 
structured the Takings Clause to impose two restrictions on the 
government’s ability to take private property.142 First, it requires 
that the government take property only for a “public use.”143 
Second, the Takings Clause constrains government seizures of 
property by imposing fiscal burdens for such activity.144 More 
precisely, the government must pay a property owner “just 
compensation” whenever (1) a state actor, (2) authorized by law, 
(3) effectuates a taking, (4) of a private actor’s property, (5) for a 
valid public use.145  
Similar to other constitutional provisions, the Takings 
Clause establishes only broad principles necessitating judicial 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Treanor, supra note 140, at 695 (illustrating that “neither colonial 
statutes nor the first state constitutions recognized a right to receive 
compensation when the government took property from an individual”). But cf. 
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426 (describing legislation passed by multiple colonial 
legislatures to protect against uncompensated takings of personal property for 
public use or service). 
 142.  Scholars are split as to whether the original understanding of the 
Takings Clause applied only to government seizures of private property, or 
whether it also encompassed regulatory takings. Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 196 (1985) 
(advocating an expansive interpretation of the Takings Clause to require 
compensation for virtually every interference with an individual’s existing set of 
property rights), with Treanor, supra note 140, at 791–97 (contending that the 
original understanding of the Takings Clause included only physical seizures of 
property by the government). 
 143.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)). 
 144.  See id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” (emphasis added)). If the government is obligated to pay just 
compensation under the Takings Clause, it is unlikely to seize property unless 
the value of the public use outweighs the market value of the property. See 
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373 (Fed Cir. 2006) (Plager, J., 
dissenting) (“By requiring just compensation the Constitution . . . places a 
constraint on government action by imposing the cost of such action on the 
Government’s fisc, thus subjecting administrative action to the discipline of 
public decision-making and legislative authorization.”), reh’g en banc denied, 
464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Michael W. McConnell, The Raisin Case, 2015 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 313, 314–15 (2015) (describing the logic of the Takings Clause).  
 145.  See Cotter, supra note 26, at 535 (summarizing the elements of a 
takings claim). 
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interpretation when applied to particular facts.146 The text of the 
Takings Clause leaves three critical questions 
unanswered: (1) What constitutes a “taking;”147 (2) What qualifies 
as a “public use;”148 and (3) What is the appropriate measure for 
“just compensation”?149 
A significant development in takings jurisprudence is the 
adoption of a broad interpretation of public use.150 In 1984, the 
Supreme Court clarified the expansive nature of the Takings 
Clause.151 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,152 the Court 
held that a state could use the eminent domain process to take 
privately held land and redistribute it to a wider population of 
private residents.153 The case involved a challenge to Hawaii’s 
Land Reform Act of 1967,154 which sought to reduce the 
concentration of land ownership.155 The problem resulted from a 
                                                                                                     
 146.  See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 803–10 (1995) 
(discussing modern understandings of the Takings Clause and how it differs 
from early, historical interpretations). 
 147.  See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945) 
(defining the term “taken” within the Fifth Amendment expansively to cover, 
not only substitution of ownership, but also deprivation of ownership, including 
damage to, depreciation in value of, and destruction of property). 
 148.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (clarifying that the 
concept of public welfare, which influences determinations of public use, 
represents spiritual values as well as physical, aesthetic, and monetary values). 
 149.  See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 237–38 (2003) 
(explaining that just compensation is measured in terms of loss to the owner, 
which is determined by fair market value); see also Bost. Chamber of Commerce 
v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (declaring that the appropriate measure of 
just compensation is “what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained”). 
 150.  See Dustin Marlan, Trademark Takings: Trademarks As Constitutional 
Property Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1581, 1587–91 (2013) (commenting on the development of takings jurisprudence 
and the expansion of the public use language in the Takings Clause). 
 151.  See Public Use-Economic Development, 119 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287 
(2005) (“For over a century, courts have adopted a broad view of what 
constitutes a ‘public use’ for purposes of the Takings Clause.”). 
 152.  467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 153.  See id. at 232–36 (considering a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was 
taken from lessors and transferred to lessees, for just compensation, with the 
goal of reducing the concentration of private land ownership). 
 154.  See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516–22 (1976) (codifying the Land Reform Act of 
1967). 
 155.  See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232 (noting that previous efforts to divide 
Hawaiian lands proved unsuccessful). 
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feudal land tenure system, which did not recognize the concept of 
fee simple ownership.156 Consequently, a handful of individuals 
owned a large percentage of the land available for residential 
development.157 To alleviate this problem, the Land Reform Act 
authorized a redistribution of fee simple titles from the few 
landowners to private residents, who were often lessors, through 
the power of eminent domain.158 
The Court held that, if a compensated taking is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose, then the taking is 
constitutional.159 Therefore, if the government rationally believes 
that a taking will promote a valid objective, it will satisfy the 
public use requirement.160 In the years following Midkiff, the 
Public Use Clause did not impose a significant impediment to 
state and local efforts to condemn private property.161 Courts 
exhibited substantial deference to legislative determinations that 
particular uses of property served an appropriate municipal 
function.162 As a result, public-private urban redevelopment 
efforts intensified.163 
                                                                                                     
 156.  See id. (explaining that, during extensive hearings, the Hawaii 
legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership skewed the State’s 
residential fee simple market, inflated land prices, and “injured the public 
tranquility and welfare”). 
 157.  See id. (reporting that, although the State and Federal Governments 
owned approximately 49% of the State’s land, seventy-two private landowners 
owned 47% of Hawaiian lands). 
 158.  See id. at 232–34 (describing the title transfer process that the Land 
Reform Act of 1967 implemented). 
 159.  See id. at 230 (noting that condemnations and private-to-private 
transfers are constitutional under the Takings Clause so long as they are 
“rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”). 
 160.  See id. at 244–45 (explaining that, although a purely private 
government taking cannot withstand the Fifth Amendment scrutiny, courts are 
highly deferential to the legislature in the determination of whether a taking 
will serve a public use). 
 161.  See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 963, 965 (2011) (illustrating that the Midkiff decision embraced a wide 
range of public purposes); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (1986) (“In practice . . . most observers today think that 
the public use limitation is a dead letter.”). 
 162.  See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 550–52 
(2009) (describing that many states engage in the controversial practice of 
partnering with or employing private development corporations to condemn 
property for redevelopment projects). 
 163.  See Blais, supra note 161, at 966–67 (noting that the Midkiff decision 
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More recently, the Court held that the condemnation and 
transfer of property from one private actor to another private 
actor as part of a “comprehensive redevelopment plan” was a 
public use.164 In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court addressed 
the City of New London’s authority to seize private residential 
property to sell to private developers.165 This was done in 
accordance with the City’s comprehensive development plan, 
which included the expected arrival of a new research facility, 
constructed by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer.166 
The Court largely focused on the City of New London’s 
planning and projected economic growth.167 The City claimed that 
the associated public benefits were neither incidental nor 
pretextual and satisfied the Fifth Amendment.168 The majority 
agreed in a 5-to-4 decision.169 According to the Court, 
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long 
accepted function of government”170 that cannot be distinguished 
from a public purpose.171 
                                                                                                     
permitted state and local governments to expand the scope of redevelopment 
projects “beyond slum clearance and urban renewal to urban revitalization and 
redevelopment”). 
 164.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–81 (2005) 
(illustrating that, historically, the Court has interpreted the Takings Clause as 
being broad and inclusive as to what public needs satisfy the public use 
requirement). 
 165.  See id. at 475 (noting that, after negotiations with several residents 
failed, the City initiated condemnation proceedings and claimed the land as its 
own). 
 166.  See id. (noting that the City of New London did not claim that the 
properties were “blighted or otherwise in poor condition”). 
 167.  See id. at 480–82 (describing that resolution turned on whether the 
City of New London’s economic development plan accomplished a “public 
purpose,” defined broadly, and with deference to legislative judgments (citing 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 266 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229 (1984))). 
 168.  See id. at 478 (explaining that the Public Use Clause prohibits 
transfers of private property with only incidental or pretextual public benefits). 
 169.  See id. at 483–84 (characterizing the City of New London’s economic 
development plan as “comprehensive,” and concluding that the proposed plan 
and taking undeniably served a public purpose). 
 170.  Id. at 484. 
 171.  See id. (“There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing 
economic development from the other public purposes that we have 
recognized.”). 
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Kelo remains controversial 
and resulted in an unprecedented political backlash, including 
state legislative action.172 The decision is significant, however, for 
reaffirming the broad nature of the public use requirement.173 
Post-Kelo, two categories of public use are widely recognized 
as valid: First, the Fifth Amendment clearly authorizes 
government to take private property without consent if it is to be 
used by the government for general public benefit.174 Second, the 
government is authorized to transfer private property to another 
private entity, provided that the transfer is for a public rather 
than private purpose and that there is no provision of state law 
that prohibits such conduct.175 
B. Taking Property: The Per Se Rule 
Seizures of property under the Takings Clause fall into one of 
three categories: per se (possessory) takings,176 regulatory 
takings,177 or judicial takings.178 In the context of professional 
                                                                                                     
 172.  For a comprehensive account of state legislative responses to Kelo, see 
Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 84 
(2015) (noting that, in the years after Kelo, a total of forty-seven states 
increased protection against takings for private use through constitutional, 
legislative, or judicial action); D. Zachary Hudson, Note, Eminent Domain 
Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1282 (2010) (“[M]any states altered their eminent 
domain statutes or amended their constitutions to ensure that economic 
development could not serve as a legitimate basis for exercising the state’s 
eminent domain power.”). 
 173.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487–90 (2005) 
(illustrating that a ruling in favor of petitioners would represent a departure 
from prior precedents). 
 174.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)). 
 175.  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479–80 (interpreting the “public use” language of 
the Takings Clause to encompass “public purpose”). 
 176.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 
(1982) (noting that the Court has consistently found a taking when faced with a 
constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property). 
 177.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(challenging an alleged regulatory taking, which is a less obvious type of taking 
that results from government regulations that have a significant adverse effect 
on an individual’s use and enjoyment of land). The Penn Central Court 
developed a three-factor balancing test that determines whether a government 
regulation amounts to a regulatory taking. Id. at 123. The factors 
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sports franchises, however, a successful exercise of eminent 
domain power against a team implicates only the doctrines 
associated with per se takings.179 The taking would not subject a 
private owner to restrictions on the ability to use, develop, or 
dispose of team property.180 Additionally, the exercise of eminent 
domain in this context would not involve a court declaration that 
“what was once an established right of private property no longer 
exists.”181 Rather, attempted seizures of professional sports 
franchises involve a municipality’s desire to acquire all property 
rights associated with ownership.182 Following the payment of 
just compensation to the appropriate party, eminent domain 
effectively transfers title from a private party to the 
government.183 
                                                                                                     
include: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. See, e.g., Connolly 
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (restating the Penn 
Central balancing test). 
 178.  See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (plurality opinion) (breathing life into the doctrine of 
judicial takings—the concept that judicial decisions, similar to other 
government actions, might be deemed to take property rights under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). In that case, petitioners challenged the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s determination that, under state law, depositing sand 
on eroded beaches constituted an avulsion whereby ownership accrued to the 
state. Id. at 711–12. In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court declared that, if 
“a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no 
longer exists, it has taken that property.” Id. at 714–15. 
 179.  See Lindsay, supra note 97, at 937 (recognizing that historical attempts 
to seize a professional sports franchise have involved efforts to acquire complete 
ownership of all team property (emphasis added)). 
 180.  See Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One 
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012) (asserting that 
major regulatory initiatives undertaken by the government “rarely require a 
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses”). 
 181.  Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 714–15 (2010). 
 182.  See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (1985) (noting that the 
City of Oakland sought, among other things, to condemn the intangible property 
rights associated with the Raiders franchise); Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D. Md. 1985) 
(“As a preliminary matter, the Court points out that it is now beyond dispute 
that intangible property is properly the subject of condemnation proceedings.”). 
 183.  See Leone, supra note 69, at 506 (“Both Baltimore and Oakland 
attempted to take title to their teams through eminent domain.”). 
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The Supreme Court has found per se takings when (1) the 
government physically seizes private property, which results in a 
permanent physical occupation,184 and (2) when a government 
regulation results in the loss of all economically beneficial or 
productive use of property.185 A permanent physical seizure of 
private property, however, does not mean forever.186 All takings 
are “temporary” at some level because the government may 
relinquish control of the property at a later time.187 This is true 
regardless of the type of property taken or the method of 
seizure.188 
C. Taking Personal Property 
The Fifth Amendment protects multiple forms of property 
other than real property.189 At its historical core, the Takings 
Clause protects physical property.190 This category of property 
includes both real property and personal property.191 According to 
                                                                                                     
 184.  See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 441 (1982) (determining that a government-sanctioned, “permanent 
physical occupation of property” is a taking, regardless of the reason for the 
government’s taking). 
 185.  See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) 
(determining that, if a government regulation eliminates all economically 
beneficial or productive use of privately owned land in the name of the common 
good, that is, to leave the owner’s property economically idle, the owner has 
suffered a taking which requires just compensation). 
 186.  See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(describing that the term “‘permanent’ does not mean forever, or anything like 
it,” and that a government taking for a limited period of time does not absolve 
the government of its liability). 
 187.  See id. (clarifying that the government may return condemned property 
to its original owner or otherwise release its interest through other means). 
 188.  See id. (explaining that physical takings of property through 
condemnation and easements by virtue of regulations do not necessarily 
continue into perpetuity). 
 189.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984) 
(holding that the Fifth Amendment protects trade secrets, an intangible form of 
intellectual property, from uncompensated government seizures). 
 190.  See Treanor, supra note 140, at 708–13 (describing Madison’s rationale 
for the Fifth Amendment, which included a desire to ensure the protection of 
physical property). 
 191.  See id. (arguing that Madison’s writings reveal a commitment to 
protecting both personal and real property). 
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the Supreme Court, Takings Clause protection extends to a range 
of real property interests, including fee simple estates, 
leaseholds,192 easements,193 and mortgages.194 Additionally, it 
encompasses multiple intangible property rights.195 But, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council,196 the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal 
property than real property.197 According to the Lucas Court, 
traditional understandings of property rights permitted a 
distinction between the two types of property.198 
In 2015, the Supreme Court rebutted this presumption and 
held that personal property is constitutionally protected private 
property under the Takings Clause.199 The case, Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture (The Raisin Case), involved a 
challenge to a federal scheme designed to stabilize the market for 
several agricultural products, including raisins.200 The program 
                                                                                                     
 192.  See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945) 
(concerning condemnation proceedings initiated to procure temporary use of 
property held under a long-term lease by General Motors Corporation). 
 193.  See United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910) (treating the 
taking of an easement as a physical appropriation of land). 
 194.  See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 
(1935) (finding that an amendment to federal bankruptcy law providing for the 
scaling down of mortgage debts without the full repayment of the loans that 
they secured violated the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause). 
 195.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984) 
(holding that trade secrets constitute constitutionally protected private property 
under the Takings Clause); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980) (finding that the Takings Clause protects the right to 
retain the interest earned on principal); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 
579 (1934) (determining that valid contracts constitute Fifth Amendment 
property). 
 196.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 197.  See id. at 1014, 1027–28 (describing the historical concern with 
physical appropriations and their equivalents). 
 198.  See id. (analyzing the perceived difference in the bundle of rights 
associated with real and personal property). 
 199.  See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425–33 (2015) 
(concluding that the Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay just 
compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real 
property). 
 200.  The Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937 authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to promulgate “marketing orders,” which set quotas for certain 
agricultural products. Id. at 2424. The Raisin Administrative Committee, a 
government entity, determined the required allocation of individual growers. Id. 
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prohibited raisin growers from placing a certain percentage of 
their crop into the market and fined growers for 
noncompliance.201 It also required raisin growers to deliver these 
“reserve raisins” to a governmental body (Raisin Committee).202 
Without paying any compensation, the Raisin Committee 
subsequently acquired title to the reserve raisins and disposed of 
them at its discretion.203 Raisin growers retained a proportional, 
contingent interest in the value of raisins reserved for the 
government if the proceeds exceeded the administrative costs of 
the Raisin Committee.204 
Citing understandings of property law dating back to the 
Magna Carta,205 the Court concluded that Fifth Amendment 
protections equally apply to both personal property and real 
property.206 According to the Court, nothing in the text, history, 
or logic of the Takings Clause permitted any other 
interpretation.207 Applying this understanding to the facts, the 
                                                                                                     
Earlier in the litigation, Justice Elena Kagan referred to the California raisin 
statute “the world’s most outdated law.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, 
49, Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (No. 12-123) (addressing a 
procedural aspect of the case). Justice Antonin Scalia agreed, calling it “a crazy 
statute.” Id. 
 201.  Petitioners grew and produced raisins. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424. After 
refusing to comply with the set-aside requirement, the Government assessed a 
fine of $483,843.53 against the Hornes. Id. at 2433. This fine allegedly 
represented the market value of the missing raisins. Id. at 2425. The 
government also assessed “an additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for 
disobeying the order to turn them over.” Id. 
 202.  See id. at 2424 (describing that the Raisin Committee ordered raisin 
growers to set aside 47% of their crop from 2002–2003 and 30% from 2003–
2004). 
 203.  See id. (explaining that, once title is acquired, the Raisin Committee 
sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them to charity, 
releases them to growers who agree to reduce their production, or disposes of 
them by other means consistent with the purposes of the program). 
 204.  The government characterized the proportional interest retained by 
growers as the “the most important property interest” in the reserve raisins. Id. 
at 2428–29. Therefore, they argued that no Fifth Amendment taking occurred. 
Id. at 2429. 
 205.  See id. at 2426 (illustrating that the principles reflected in the Takings 
Clause go back “at least 800 years to Magna Carta, which specifically protected 
agricultural crops from uncompensated takings”). 
 206.  See id. at 2426 (“[T]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just 
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”). 
 207.  See id. (commenting on arbitrary and oppressive appropriations of 
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Court determined that the regulatory reserve requirement 
imposed on raisin growers was a possessory per se taking, which 
required just compensation.208 
D. Taking Intangible Intellectual Property 
Prior to The Raisin Case, the Supreme Court never directly 
addressed the question of whether the Takings Clause applied to 
property other than real property.209 An explanation offered by 
one scholar is, essentially, that “no one ever doubted that the 
Takings Clause [applied] fully to personal property.”210 However, 
The Raisin Case unequivocally concludes, as the majority wrote, 
that “[t]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just 
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your 
home.”211 
At first glance, the Court’s opinion seems to examine only the 
application of the Takings Clause to personal property, ignoring 
any potential implications on intellectual property interests.212 
                                                                                                     
personal property during the Revolutionary War, which likely influence the 
inclusion of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment). 
 208.  See id. at 2427–28 (concluding that the reserve requirement imposed on 
raisin growers constituted a “clear physical taking”). The Court also addressed 
two more issues presented by The Raisin Case. See id. at 2425 (“The petition for 
certiorari poses three questions, which we answer in turn.”). The government 
claimed that there was no taking because growers retained an important 
property interest in the reserve raisins: the contingent interest in net proceeds. 
Id. at 2428–30. It also argued that the government program operated as a valid 
condition on permission to engage in commerce. Id. at 2429–30. The Court did 
not find either of the government’s arguments compelling. Id. at 2430–31. It 
reiterated, however, that raisins are private property and that any physical 
taking of them for public use requires just compensation. Id. 
 209.  See McConnell, supra note 144, at 322–23 (illustrating that the 
Supreme Court had previously applied the Takings Clause (in its per se form) to 
personal property, including patents, steamboats, machinery, and money, but 
that it did so without explanation). 
 210.  See id. at 322 (noting the surprising nature of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that per se takings rules did not apply to personal property because 
nothing in the “text history or logic of the Takings Clause suggest otherwise”). 
 211.  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); see also 
McConnell, supra note 144, at 317 (noting that no dissenting justice challenged 
this interpretation of the Takings Clause). 
 212.  See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425–33 (discussing why the Takings Clause 
extends to personal property as well as real property). 
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However, the Court’s opinion briefly mentions the protections 
that the Taking Clause provides for patents.213 Addressing the 
history of the Takings Clause, the Court reiterated that a patent 
manifests an exclusive property interest in the patented 
invention, held by the patentee.214 Such a property interest 
“cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without 
just compensation.”215 The Court then analogized the exclusive 
property interest created by a patent to interests in real property, 
held by a private purchaser.216 But, aside from utilizing a 
discussion of the property interests created by patents to 
illustrate the development of takings jurisprudence, the Court did 
not delve further into a discussion of intangible intellectual 
property interests.217 
As takings jurisprudence makes clear, the Takings Clause, 
and the associated constitutional protections it affords, is most 
often applied to real or tangible property.218 However, this reality 
should not prohibit courts from applying the Takings Clause to 
intangible property.219 In fact, takings jurisprudence 
demonstrates a commitment to protecting many forms of property 
besides real property.220 This makes the fact that the Court’s 
                                                                                                     
 213.  See id. at 2427 (noting the constitutional protection of patents to make 
the assertion that personal property is “no less protected against physical 
appropriation than real property”). 
 214.  See id. (citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (concerning 
the U.S. Post Office’s alleged appropriation of a patent, which was obtained for 
an improved postmarking or stamping machine)). 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  See id. (“[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in 
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government 
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use 
without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.”). 
 217.  See id. at 2427–28 (discussing the Court’s takings jurisprudence and 
disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between real and personal 
property). 
 218.  See Cotter, supra note 26, at 536 (noting that the vast majority of 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the Takings Clause concern actions initiated 
in response to government takings of real, as opposed to personal or intangible, 
property). 
 219.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(holding that trade secrets are protected under the Takings Clause). 
 220.  For a discussion of the historical protections afforded to patents, see 
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700–11 
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opinion in The Raisin Case expressly relies on a patent case to 
support a broad reading of the word “property” in the Fifth 
Amendment rather curious.221 The Court could have utilized 
language from another case to establish the broad nature of 
property rights, but it did not.222 Additionally, the Court has 
never held that the Takings Clause directly applies to patents.223 
Taken together, these realities strongly suggest that 
constitutional property is not limited to tangible property rights 
and that the current Court considers intellectual property rights 
protected by the Takings Clause. 
IV. Types of Intellectual Property 
This Part provides a brief overview of the four major 
categories of intellectual property rights—trade secrets, patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks—and how the private property 
interests of each differ.224 Additionally, it introduces whether the 
property interests of each qualify as constitutional property for 
purposes of the Takings Clause.225 
                                                                                                     
(2007) (examining the judicial and legislative records and arguing that 
nineteenth-century courts, “enthusiastically applied the Takings Clause to 
patents”). But, as Mossoff’s Article describes, modern courts and scholars have 
obscured the constitutional proposition that patents are private property rights 
secured under the Constitution. Id. at 711–24. 
 221.  See supra notes 212–217 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s use of a nineteenth-century patent case to illustrate the 
development of takings jurisprudence). 
 222.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (noting that property “extends 
beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s 
‘labour and invention’”). 
 223.  Rather, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated 
that patents are not constitutionally protected property under the Takings 
Clause. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented 
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the 
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and 
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 224.  See infra Part IV.A–D (differentiating between the four major 
categories of intellectual property and the property rights associated with each). 
 225.  See infra Part IV.A–D (illustrating that, while trade secrets receive 
heightened protection under the Takings Clause, the application of the Takings 
Clause to other categories of intellectual property is unclear). 
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A. Trade Secrets 
 “A trade secret is any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.”226 The bundle of rights associated with 
trade secrets is defined by the extent to which the owner protects 
his interest from disclosure to others.227 Though state laws 
primarily govern trade secrets,228 they receive heightened 
constitutional protection under the Takings Clause.229 
B. Patents 
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”230 Under this power, 
Congress has the right to enact various laws regarding patents, 
which are exclusive property rights in certain types of inventions 
                                                                                                     
 226.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 
1995); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) 
(defining trade secrets as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information which is used in one’s business, and that gives one an opportunity 
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it”). 
 227.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (AM. LAW INST. 
1995) (stating that, among other things, the owner of a trade secret may exclude 
others from acquiring the secret by “improper means,” or from using or 
disclosing the secret if the other knew, or had reason to know, that the 
circumstances of disclosure gave rise to a duty to maintain secrecy). 
 228.  See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets 
Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 58 (2004) (“Unlike patents and 
copyrights, trade secrets are protected primarily by state law rules, with some 
limited federal protection thrown into the mix.”); Christopher B. Seaman, The 
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 330–38 (2015) 
(describing that, although state laws generally govern trade secrets, a 
significant body of federal statutory law is potentially applicable to the growing 
issue of trade secret theft). 
 229.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984) 
(holding that trade secrets associated with the development of an agrochemical 
product were property under Missouri law and, thus, protected against 
confiscation under the Takings Clause). 
 230.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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and other useful information.231 While Congress enacted the first 
patent law in 1790,232 the present Patent Act states that, once 
granted, a patent confers the patentee with an exclusive property 
interest for a term of twenty years.233 As recognized by the 
Supreme Court, “patent protection strikes a delicate balance 
between creating incentives that lead to creation, invention, 
discovery, and impeding the flow of information that might 
permit, indeed spur, invention.”234 
Similar to other types of intellectual property, “[t]he question 
that haunts scholars and courts today is whether patents also are 
constitutional private property, falling within the ambit of 
protections afforded to private property under the Takings 
Clause.”235 In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit provided an answer.236 Despite being considered “private 
                                                                                                     
 231.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (granting a patentee the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention in the United 
States). 
 232.  See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793) 
(stating that a patent protects “the sole and exclusive right and liberty of 
making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention 
or discovery”). 
 233.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (“Subject to the payment of fees under 
this title, such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the 
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the 
patent was filed in the United States . . . .”). 
 234.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013) (involving a challenge to the validity of multiple gene patents) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 235.  Mossoff, supra note 220, at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented 
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the 
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and 
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal 
Circuit is particularly influential in the area of patent law because it is the only 
federal appellate court with per se jurisdiction over patent appeals. See Holmes 
Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2002) 
(explaining that, although the Federal Circuit “does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all cases raising patent issues,” there is an interest in 
“directing appeals in patent cases to the specialized court that was created, in 
part, to promote uniformity in the development of this area of the law”). 
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property interests,”237 the court determined that patents are not 
constitutional property under the Takings Clause.238 
C. Copyrights 
Copyrights, a third form of intellectual property, provide 
authors of original works with a bundle of proprietary rights for 
limited times.239 Similar to patents, copyrights are also creatures 
of federal law.240 A legal scheme enumerated in the Constitution 
and developed by Congress, copyright encourages the authorship 
and dissemination of original forms of expression.241 As with 
other categories of intangible intellectual property, the issue of 
applying Takings Clause scrutiny to copyrights is relatively 
unexplored by the courts,242 resulting in scholars reaching 
different conclusions on the issue.243 
                                                                                                     
 237.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, 
patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”). 
 238.  See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352 (concluding that, because patents are 
“creatures of federal law” and not created by “an independent source such as 
state law,” they do not receive the protections afforded by the Takings Clause). 
 239.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (embodying the concept of private ownership 
by securing to a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, 
perform, and display the secured work, as well as the right to prepare derivative 
works). 
 240.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (endowing Congress with the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (codifying United States copyright 
law). 
 241.  See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 970–77 
(1990) (outlining the basics of copyright as a category of private intellectual 
property). 
 242.  See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 233 
(2002) (stating that the “[a]pplication of the Takings Clause to intellectual 
property—trademarks, copyrights and patents—has not yet been seriously 
tested in the courts”). 
 243.  Compare Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why 
Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They 
Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 43 (2007) (arguing that the Zoltek 
court’s conclusion was correct and that patents should not trigger Takings 
Clause protection), with Cotter, supra note 26, at 532 (concluding that, “on 
balance, most federal uses of patents and copyrights probably do implicate the 
Takings Clause”). 
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D. Trademarks 
Fundamentally, trademarks differ from the other categories 
of intellectual property protection.244 According to the federal 
Lanham Act,245 which governs trademark law, trademarks 
include “any word, name, symbol, device or any combination 
thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona 
fide intention to use in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish 
his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods.”246 In contrast to patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets, trademarks do not share the same 
underlying purpose of encouraging and rewarding innovation, 
physical creation, or original authorship.247 Rather, historical and 
modern trademark law is the manifestation of two competing 
policy goals: (1) the protection of consumers from deception and 
confusion, and (2) the protection of the private property interests 
a trademark represents.248 
                                                                                                     
 244.  See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:15 (4th ed. 2012) (“Trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, 
have no existence independent of the good will of the products or services in 
connection with which the mark is used.”). 
 245.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012) (codifying the Lanham Act, as 
amended). 
 246.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) is the federal agency responsible for granting U.S. patents and 
registering trademarks. Id. § 1051. It derives its authority to register 
trademarks from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. 
(permitting the application for registration of “a trademark used in commerce” 
or of a trademark that a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce). 
 247.  See supra Part IV.A–C (discussing, among other things, the policy goals 
associated with patents, copyrights, and trade secrets). 
 248.  Before the Lanham Act’s passage, Congressman Lanham, the bill’s 
sponsor, elaborated on the goals of trademark law:  
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to 
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product 
bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get 
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the 
owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in 
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment 
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark 
owner. 
S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3 (1946); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2012) (“In the author’s 
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Until Congress enacted the first federal trademark statutes 
in the late nineteenth century, state common law protected 
trademarks.249 Today, trademarks receive federal protection 
under the Lanham Act.250 Originally enacted in 1946, the 
Lanham Act codifies and expands on years of state common law 
trademark traditions.251 Generally, its clauses provide a 
registration scheme for trademarks and service marks used in 
interstate commerce.252 It also establishes remedies against third 
parties for infringement253 and dilution.254 Finally, the Lanham 
Act provides federal protection against various acts of unfair 
competition, which, among other things, include false advertising, 
false designations of origin, and false description or 
representation.255 
At common law and under the Lanham Act, exclusive use of 
a trademark is awarded to the first person to make a lawful, 
                                                                                                     
opinion, to select as paramount either protection of the trademark property or 
protection of consumers would be to oversimplify the dual goals of trademark 
law, both historical and modern: the protection of both consumers from 
deception and confusion and the protection of the trademark as property.”). 
 249.  Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in 1870, which 
anchored protection for the property rights associated with trademarks in the 
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. See Act of July 8, 1870, 16 
Stat. 198 (providing a system of federal registration for all trademarks used 
throughout the United States). The Supreme Court later struck down the 
Trademark Act of 1870 because it exceeded Congress’s authority under the 
Patent and Copyright Clause. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92–94 
(1879) (reasoning that the Patent and Copyright Clause did not protect 
trademarks because a trademark does not “depend upon novelty, invention, 
discovery, or any work of the brain”). The Court also determined that the Act 
violated the Commerce Clause because it extended federal protection to 
trademarks regardless of whether the mark was used in interstate commerce. 
Id. at 97–98. 
 250.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012) (codifying U.S. trademark law). 
 251.  See Seaman, supra note 228, at 382–84 (describing the federalization of 
trademark law, which ultimately resulted in strengthened trademark rights). 
 252.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72 (2012) (outlining registration under the 
Principal Register, the primary register of trademarks maintained by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office). 
 253.  See id. §§ 1125(a), 1114 (providing for a federal cause of action for the 
infringement of registered marks and unregistered marks). 
 254.  See id. § 1125(c) (codifying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 
and providing a federal cause of action for the dilution of famous marks). 
 255.  See id. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (creating a federal cause of action for various 
common-law unfair competition torts). 
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commercial use of the mark in commerce.256 This permits the 
senior user or owner to exclude others from using the same mark 
or a confusingly similar mark.257 Combined with the protections 
afforded by trademarks, this exclusionary function safeguards the 
economic interests of owners and consumers in the preservation 
of brand identity.258 
V. Trademarks as Constitutionally Protected Private Property 
Trademarks possess many of the qualities of other forms of 
constitutionally protected private property.259 The framers of the 
Constitution limited the Fifth Amendment guarantee to 
property.260 In doing so, they “obliged the Supreme Court to come 
up with criteria for identifying those interests that qualify as 
property and for excluding others that would fail the test.”261 This 
is because neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other 
constitutional provision defines what constitutes property.262 As a 
result, courts have endeavored to distinguish between those 
                                                                                                     
 256.  Essentially, an owner acquires the property rights associated with 
trademarks through its use in commerce. See id. § 1051(A)(3) (requiring that the 
applicant for a trademark believe, in good faith, that they are the first entity to 
use the designation as a mark). For competing users of an inherently distinctive 
mark, ownership and priority of use goes to the “first entity to use the 
designation as a mark.” See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:1 (4th ed. 2015) (describing trademark priority at 
common law, which follows the rule of first-in-time, first-in-right). 
 257.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1072, 1115 (2012) (stating that registration of 
the mark serves as nationwide, constructive notice of ownership and use). 
 258.  See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying 
goals of trademark law). 
 259.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1599 (arguing that “trademarks possess 
the qualities of constitutional property and are therefore subject to the Takings 
Clause”). 
 260.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (permitting the government to take private 
property for public use upon payment of just compensation). 
 261.  See Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the 
Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments 
Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity 
Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 857 (1998) (contemplating whether 
intellectual property constitutes constitutional property under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 262.  See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text (describing three 
critical questions left unanswered by the Fifth Amendment). 
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forms of property that fall outside the bounds of the Fifth 
Amendment and those that receive heightened protection from 
government seizure.263 
Though it is well understood that “[t]he Takings Clause does 
not extend equal protection to each form of property it 
recognizes,”264 takings jurisprudence is often characterized as a 
“muddle.”265 The doctrines utilized to interpret the Takings 
Clause are difficult to ascertain, continually evolving, and 
sometimes lack theoretical coherence.266 The application of the 
Takings Clause to intangible intellectual property rights—which 
are distinguishable in numerous ways from the more common 
seizure of real property—only complicates the matter further.267 
The issue of whether trademarks constitute constitutionally 
protected private property under the Fifth Amendment is a 
relatively underexplored area of the law.268 However, two 
landmark intellectual property cases provide some guidance on 
the issue.269 First, in 1984, the Supreme Court held that the 
                                                                                                     
 263.  See Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
973, 976–77 (2015) (“[N]ot all legal rights and privileges amount to property.”). 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings 
Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 613, 618 (2007) (arguing that, in reaffirming the broad nature of the 
Public Use Clause, Kelo may have “paradoxically made it more difficult for state 
and local governments to exercise that power, because it only heightened 
distrust of municipal actions affecting property”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The 
Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings 
“Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006) (tracing the roots of the doctrinal 
muddle in the context of regulatory takings); Carol M. Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 
561–62 (1984) (characterizing Takings Clause jurisprudence as “[b]y far the 
most intractable constitutional property issue”). 
 266.  See Karkkainen, supra note 265, at 827–33 (introducing the doctrinal 
challenges associated with the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence). 
 267.  See Cotter, supra note 26, at 529 (“If the law of takings as applied to 
real and personal property is the ‘muddle’ that many commentators insist it is, 
the law of taking with regard to intellectual property can only be characterized 
as a muddle within the muddle.”). 
 268.  See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 242, at 233 (explaining that courts 
have not seriously tested the application of the Takings Clause to the various 
categories of intellectual property); see also Marlan, supra note 150, at 1599–
1620 (exploring the case for trademarks as constitutionally protected private 
property). 
 269.  See infra Part V.B (discussing two judicial decision that concern the 
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Takings Clause protects trade secrets.270 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion 
regarding the status of patents.271 Second, in 2006, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that “patents, despite being considered private 
property interests, are not constitutional property under the 
Takings Clause.”272 Utilizing both cases and arguments for and 
against the Fifth Amendment’s application to trademarks, this 
Part contends that trademarks should be considered 
constitutionally protected private property.273 
A. Public Goods or Private Property? 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects private 
property interests.274 Public goods, on the other hand, do not 
qualify for constitutional protection.275 A common 
counterargument to treating trademarks as constitutional 
property rests on this latter principle.276 
                                                                                                     
application of the Takings Clause to trade secrets and patents). 
 270.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(holding that trade secrets constitute property under the Takings Clause). 
 271.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented 
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the 
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and 
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 272.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1584 (arguing that trademarks 
constitute both legal private property and constitutionally protected property for 
the purposes of the Takings Clause). 
 273.  See infra Part V.C (concluding that, based on contemporary judicial 
guidance and the propertization of intellectual property, trademarks are 
constitutionally protected private property). 
 274.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)). 
 275.  Public goods are non-rivalrous, meaning that, once the good is 
produced, many individuals can simultaneously consume that good without 
interfering with the consumption opportunities available to others. See David 
W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22, 
24 (2006) (rejecting the private goods characterization of trademarks). 
 276.  Recall that trademark law is the manifestation of two competing policy 
goals, one of which is the protection of consumers from deception and confusion. 
See supra note 248 and accompanying text (describing the historical and modern 
goals of trademark law). 
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Arguably, traditional property doctrines resist treating 
trademarks as private property because restrictive rights in a 
mark extend only to its use in conjunction with the sale of goods 
and services.277 Essentially, by using a mark to identify and 
distinguish his products or services in commerce, the owner of a 
mark merely contributes to the store of information available for 
consumer use.278 This permits consumers to use a mark in a 
beneficial, but non-rivalrous manner.279 Consumers thus may 
invoke the communicative, source-indicating value of the mark 
without interfering with the mark holder’s rights or those of other 
consumers.280 This reality, some argue, erodes the economic 
foundation for the propertization of trademarks.281 
Trademarks no longer serve a primary function as 
“consumer-driven, communicative devices.”282 Those who claim 
that trademarks do not constitute constitutionally protected 
private property fail to acknowledge the increased treatment of 
trademarks as property.283 Undeniably, trademarks serve the 
interests of consumers.284 They reduce search costs and create 
                                                                                                     
 277.  See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 
463 (1999) (disputing the economic foundation for the propertization of 
trademarks, and arguing that without legal protections, trademarks are public 
goods). 
 278.  See id. at 369 (“By identifying the source of goods, a trademark 
provides consumers with information that they need (and cannot otherwise 
readily obtain) in order to match their desires to particular products.”). 
 279.  See id. at 28–35 (arguing that the dominant modern theory of 
trademark law, which is based on the tendency of consumers to refer or search 
for products or services based on recognition of a supplier’s mark, ignores the 
public goods character of referential meaning). 
 280.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1600 (summarizing the argument that 
trademarks constitute public goods). 
 281.  See Lunney, Jr., supra note 277, at 486–87 (“[W]e have divorced 
trademark law from its historical and sensible policy focus on the probability of 
material confusion, and crafted an overbroad, ill-considered legal regime that 
serves simply to enrich certain trademark owners at the expense of 
consumers . . . .”). 
 282.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1600 (addressing the public goods 
counterargument to treating trademarks as private property). 
 283.  See id. at 1603 (“While trademark law’s expansion in the past half-
century has solidified trademarks as property rights . . . scholars have noted 
that even early American trademark law cases focused on the protection of 
owners’ trademarks as property.”). 
 284.  See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 381 
(2009) (“Trademark law is guided by market-oriented principles that encourage 
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incentives for businesses to ensure the production of quality 
products.285 As one scholar proclaimed, “The true functions of the 
trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory and 
thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming 
public.”286 Nevertheless, increased propertization has 
characterized the evolution of trademark law throughout the 
twentieth century and into the modern era.287 Eclipsing the 
consumer protection rationale, the private property-based 
functions of trademarks presently dominate.288 
B. Contemporary Judicial Guidance 
This subpart contends that Takings Clause precedent from 
other forms of intellectual property strongly suggests that 
trademarks are property rights as well. First, it discusses the 
Supreme Court’s holding that the Takings Clause protects trade 
secrets.289 It then examines the status of patents, which, 
according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, do 
not receive Fifth Amendment protection.290 Considering both 
cases, this subpart argues that trademarks satisfy the 
requirements for constitutionally protected private property 
mandated in each.291 
                                                                                                     
productivity and successful sale of goods.”). 
 285.  See id. (describing the commercial interest associated with trademarks, 
which promotes competition in the market). 
 286.  See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1927) (discussing the topic of trademark dilution). 
 287.  See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2007) (characterizing the propertization of 
trademark law as a “shift . . . away from confusion-based protection and towards 
a property-based regime that is focused only superficially on consumers”). 
 288.  See id. at 1915 (“Virtually every significant doctrinal development in 
the last century has given mark owners greater control over the use and 
meaning of their marks.”). 
 289.  See infra Part V.B.1 (describing a trade secret misappropriation claim 
by a producer of pesticides and other chemicals). 
 290.  See infra Part V.B.2 (summarizing a patent infringement claim by the 
assignee of a patent for certain methods of manufacturing carbon fiber sheets 
with controlled surface electrical resistivity). 
 291.  See infra Part V.B.3 (considering the implications of both cases for the 
constitutional protection of trademarks). 
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1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,292 the Supreme Court held that 
trade secrets are property constitutionally protected from 
government seizure without compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.293 Monsanto Company develops, produces, and sells 
pesticides and other chemicals.294 To comply with certain 
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA), the company registered all pesticides sold in 
interstate commerce with the Secretary of Agriculture.295 The 
legislation also required disclosure of a producer’s pesticide 
formulas.296 Challenging the disclosure requirement, Monsanto 
argued that disclosure of the data constituted misappropriation of 
trade secret information without just compensation.297 
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court confronted the question 
of whether the Fifth Amendment protected the trade secret 
information submitted by Monsanto.298 The Court answered in 
the affirmative.299 It determined that intangible property rights 
created by an independent source such as state law deserve the 
protection of the Takings Clause.300 In reaching that conclusion, 
                                                                                                     
 292. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 293.  See id. at 1003–04 (holding that the government’s misappropriation of 
data from a producer of pesticides and other chemical products constituted a 
Fifth Amendment taking). 
 294.  See id. at 997 (mentioning that the company sells products in “both 
domestic and foreign markets”). 
 295.  See id. at 991 (discussing FIFRA’s disclosure requirements). 
 296.  Under some circumstances, FIFRA authorized the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to use trade secret information acquired from an 
earlier permit applicant to evaluate the safety of a product developed by a 
subsequent applicant. Id. at 991–92. Additionally, it authorized the EPA to 
disclose certain data, including trade secrets and other confidential information, 
“to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” 
Id. at 996. 
 297.  See id. at 998–99 (listing Monsanto’s claims). 
 298.  See id. at 1000 (“Does Monsanto have a property interest protected by 
the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause in the health, safety, and environmental 
data it has submitted to EPA?”). 
 299.  See id. at 1003–04 (stating “[t]hat intangible property rights protected 
by state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause” and that this 
principle “has long been implicit in the thinking of” the Court). 
 300.  See id. (noting that much of the information submitted by Monsanto 
qualified as trade secrets under Missouri law). 
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the Court analogized trade secrets to real property.301 According 
to the Court, characteristics of trade secrets mirror those of more 
tangible forms of property, including assignability and the 
capacity of trade secrets to form the res of a trust.302 Next, the 
Court cited the legislative history of FIFRA to support the 
property-like nature of trade secrets.303 Discussing the very 
amendments to FIFRA that led to the litigation, Congress 
acknowledged that developers retain a “proprietary interest” in 
trade secret data.304 This entitles data submitters to 
compensation because they “have legal ownership of the data.”305 
Finally, the Court explained its history of extending Takings 
Clause protection to other forms of intangible property interests 
created by state law, including liens and contracts.306 
2. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III) 
While the Supreme Court found that trade secrets qualified 
for Fifth Amendment protection, the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion 
regarding the status of patents.307 Zoltek Corporation is the 
assignee of a patent for certain methods of manufacturing carbon 
fiber sheets with controlled surface electrical resistivity.308 The 
company claimed that Lockheed Martin, which designed and 
built F-22 fighter jets for the federal government, utilized carbon 
                                                                                                     
 301.  Id. at 1002. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  See id. at 1003 (invoking John Locke’s labour theory to conclude that 
the notion of property “extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the 
products of an individual’s labour and invention”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 307.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding that the government’s uses of a patented 
invention or method is not a seizure of any property interest belonging to the 
patentee), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and 
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 308.  See id. at 1347 (“Zoltek Corporation . . . is the assignee of United States 
Reissue Patent No. 34,162 (reissued Jan. 19, 1993) to a ‘Controlled Surface 
Electrical Resistance Carbon Fiber Sheet Product.’”). 
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fiber sheets produced through the method in Zoltek’s patent.309 
Zoltek sued, claiming that the United States committed patent 
infringement, which constituted a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.310 Relying on the 1894 case of Schillinger v. United 
States,311 the Federal Circuit held that a patent holder could not 
sue the government for patent infringement as a Fifth 
Amendment taking.312 
The Federal Circuit explained that property interests that 
qualify as constitutional property for purposes of the Takings 
Clause must arise out of “an independent source such as state 
law.”313 Patents do not meet this requirement.314 Instead, federal 
law creates and Congress defines the dimensions of the property 
interests associated with patents.315 The court also noted that 
Congress did not intend for the Fifth Amendment to protect 
patents.316 It explained that:  
In response to Schillinger, Congress provided a specific 
sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for 
infringement by the government. Had Congress intended to 
clarify the dimensions of the patent rights as property 
interests under the Fifth Amendment, there would have been 
no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity waiver.317 
Essentially, the Federal Circuit reasoned that, if the Takings 
Clause protected patent rights, then “Congress’ enactment of the 
1910 Patent Act (later codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1498)—expressly 
                                                                                                     
 309.  See id. at 1349 (describing that the government contracted with 
Lockheed Martin to build F-22 fighters, who subsequently subcontracted for the 
production of two types of silicide fiber products used in the fifth-generation, 
stealth fighter jet). 
 310.  See id. (alleging that the silicide fiber products were made for the 
government, using its claimed methods). 
 311.  See 155 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1894) (involving a claim that against the 
government for the wrongful use of a patented method for concrete stone 
paving). 
 312.  See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1350 (noting that “Schillinger remains the 
law”). 
 313.  Id. at 1352 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 
(1984)). 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  See id. (“[P]atent rights are a creature of federal law.”). 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Id. 
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waiving sovereign immunity for state-sponsored patent 
infringement in limited circumstances—would be superfluous.”318 
C. What Does This Mean for Trademarks? 
The Fifth Amendment provides trade secrets with 
heightened protection against government takings.319 No other 
form of intellectual property receives such protection.320 On the 
other hand, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that patents are 
not protected.321 Though the Monsanto and Zoltek III cases 
resulted in different outcomes, both provide a framework for 
assessing whether other forms of intellectual property receive 
constitutional protection.322 Notably, they help answer the 
question of whether trademarks constitute constitutionally 
protected private property. 
First, mindful of the basic axiom that the Constitution does 
not create property interests, both courts reinforced the state law 
creation requirement.323 In Monsanto, the Supreme Court found 
that the confidential information submitted in accordance with 
FIFRA constituted property under Missouri law.324 Subsequent 
disclosure of the data by the EPA constituted a misappropriation 
                                                                                                     
 318.  Additional Developments-Patent, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 265 
(2007). 
 319.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(summarizing the Court’s reasoning). 
 320.  See supra Part IV.A–D (illustrating that, while trade secrets receive 
heightened protection under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court has never 
held that the protections of the Takings Clause extend to other categories of 
intellectual property). 
 321.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that patents do not constitute Fifth Amendment 
property), reh’g en banc denied, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and 
vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 322.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1614 (stating that courts will likely 
apply the precedents set by the Monsanto and Zoltek III courts to a trademark 
takings issue). 
 323.  See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)). 
 324.  See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003 (characterizing the confidential 
information submitted by Monsanto as a “trade secret property rights under 
Missouri law”). 
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of trade secret information without just compensation.325 
Conversely, the Zoltek III court explained that the federal 
creation of patents disqualified them from Fifth Amendment 
protection.326 
Current patent law stems from Congress’s authority to 
regulate patents and copyrights under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.327 Unlike patents and copyrights, 
however, Congress is prohibited from regulating trademarks 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause.328 Instead, federal 
trademark jurisdiction implicitly derives its authority from the 
Commerce Clause.329 The fact that the U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly create trademarks distinguishes them from patents. 
While the Zoltek III court mentioned the federal creation of 
patents as a primary reason why they do not constitute 
constitutional property, trademarks, on the other hand, are not 
entirely “creature[s] of federal law.”330 Rather, trademarks are 
historically the products of state common law.331 This reality 
arguably satisfies the state law creation requirement for 
constitutional property. 
                                                                                                     
 325.  See id. at 1014–16 (holding that the EPA’s use and disclosure of 
Monsanto’s trade secret rights constituted a taking for public use). 
 326.  See Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1352 (concluding that, because patents are “a 
creature of federal law,” they do not constitute property interests under the 
Takings Clause). 
 327.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (authorizing Congress to enact 
legislation governing copyrights and patents). 
 328.  See supra note 249 and accompanying text (describing that, in 1879, 
the Supreme Court denied Congress the authority to register or regulate 
trademarks under the Patent and Trademark Clause). 
 329.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (permitting the application for registration 
of “a trademark used in commerce” or of a trademark that a person has a bona 
fide intention to use in commerce). 
 330.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek III), 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (describing why patents do not constitute 
constitutionally protected private property rights), reh’g en banc denied, 464 
F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317, 
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 331.  See Marlan, supra note 150, at 1617 (arguing that trademarks “meet 
the state law creation requirement for constitutional property because they are 
products of the common law”). 
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D. Putting the Pieces Together 
Applying the guidance provided by the courts in Monsanto 
and Zoltek III, trademarks theoretically constitute 
constitutionally protected private property.332 First, despite its 
codification under the federal Lanham Act, current trademark 
law largely incorporates existing common law principles 
“governing both the subject matter and scope of [trademark] 
protection.”333 As originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act 
largely adopted the principles of state trademark law, but has 
since expanded in ways that go beyond many states’ common law, 
such as the dilution remedy.334 Second, compared with other 
forms of property, trademarks meet the right-to-exclude 
theorization of property that is at the core of constitutional 
property.335 Under the Lanham Act and at common law, 
trademarks serve an exclusionary function because exclusive use 
of a mark is awarded to the first person to make a lawful, 
commercial use of the mark in commerce.336 Third, the Supreme 
Court recognizes that the notion of property “extends beyond land 
and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s 
labour and invention.”337 Trademarks arguably satisfy John 
Locke’s labor and invention conception of property discussed in 
Monsanto given “the extensive use requirements necessary . . . to 
                                                                                                     
 332.  See id. at 1629 (concluding that, among other things, trademarks are 
both legal private property and constitutionally protected property for the 
purposes of the Takings Clause). 
 333.  See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal 
Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79–80 (1996) (recounting the origins of the Lanham Act, 
the codification of which embraced a balance of interests drawn from “more than 
a century of common law adjudication”). 
 334.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012) (codifying the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995, which creates a federal cause of action to protect famous 
marks from unauthorized use, to prevent others from benefiting from the 
established goodwill of such marks, and to prevent dilution of the 
distinctiveness of such marks). 
 335.  See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 
357, 374 (1954) (explaining property as that “to which the following label can be 
attached: To the world:  Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may 
grant or withhold. Signed: Private Citizen[.] Endorsed: The State”). 
 336.  See supra Part IV.D (explaining that the exclusionary function of 
trademarks preserves both private economic interests and brand identity). 
 337.  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984). 
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obtain a trademark registration, as well as the effort put forth in 
the creation of a mark.”338 Fourth, in contrast to other forms of 
intellectual property with limited legal lives, such as patents and 
copyrights,339 the property interests associated with trademarks 
potentially exist into perpetuity.340 Considered together, the 
bundle of property rights associated with trademarks should 
qualify as constitutional property interests, subject to the 
protection of the Takings Clause. The history and development of 
trademark law,341 combined with the Supreme Court’s broad 
reading of the word “property” in the Fifth Amendment, 
reinforces this conclusion.342 
VI. Taking a Team’s Trademark 
This Part concludes that the seizure of a professional sports 
franchise’s trademark could constitute a valid public use under 
the Takings Clause.343 Assessing a Fifth Amendment taking 
requires multiple inquiries.344 As previously mentioned, the 
government must pay a property owner just compensation 
whenever (1) a state actor, (2) authorized by law, (3) effectuates a 
taking, (4) of a private actor’s property, (5) for a valid public 
                                                                                                     
 338.  Marlan, supra note 150, at 1617. 
 339.  See supra Part IV.B–C (explaining that patents and copyrights confer 
an owner with a set of property rights for limited times). 
 340.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2012) (“[E]ach registration may be renewed for 
periods of 10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the 
date of registration.”). In addition to timely renewal, the owner of a trademark 
must continue to use the mark in commerce, or risk abandonment. See id. § 
1127 (describing the risk of abandonment resulting from, among other things, 
the owner’s failure to use the mark in commerce). 
 341.  See supra Part V.A (arguing that the private property-based functions 
of trademarks currently dominate). 
 342.  See supra Part III.D (arguing that The Raisin Case supports an 
expansive definition of the word “property” in the Fifth Amendment, and that 
the Court’s decision suggests that the Takings Clause protects intellectual 
property rights). 
 343.  See supra Part III.A (explaining the history of the public use 
requirement in takings jurisprudence). 
 344.  See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing the various 
restrictions that the Takings Clause imposes on the government’s ability to take 
private property). 
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use.345 If a proposed taking satisfies each requirement, the 
government is authorized to seize the property in question 
notwithstanding the owner’s objection.346 According to the 
Supreme Court, the government’s power to effectuate a taking 
applies to private property other than real, tangible property.347 
Consequently, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment also 
applies to various forms of intangible property.348 Though not yet 
addressed by the Supreme Court, government seizures of 
trademarks should implicate the Fifth Amendment.349  
The conclusion that trademarks constitute constitutionally 
protected private property provides users of the mark with 
greater protection against government seizures.350 In the context 
of professional sports franchises, it could also provide teams with 
greater protection upon relocation.351 This Part explores the 
potential for a city to acquire a relocating franchise’s trademarks 
through the exercise of its eminent domain powers. In doing so, it 
analyzes the decisions of the courts involved with the Oakland 
Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation.352 Additionally, it 
                                                                                                     
 345.  See Cotter, supra note 26, at 535 (summarizing the elements of a 
takings claim and the requirements that the government must satisfy before 
seizing property). 
 346.  See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003) 
(confirming the proposition that, provided an owner receives just compensation 
for the taking of her property, that owner does not have standing to object to the 
government’s decision). 
 347.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(noting that other types of intangible rights constitute Fifth Amendment 
property). 
 348.  See supra notes 190–198 and accompanying text (explaining that, 
although the protection of real property lies at the historical core of takings 
protection, Fifth Amendment protection extends to multiple types of intangible 
property rights). 
 349.  See supra Part V.D (concluding that trademarks should constitute 
constitutionally protected private property). 
 350.  See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (describing why 
professional sports teams vigorously protect their trademarks and associated 
goodwill from infringement). 
 351.  See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
general restrictions imposed by the Fifth Amendment on the government’s 
ability to take private property). 
 352.  See infra Part VI.A (discussing the public use implications of the 
Oakland Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation). 
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considers the aforementioned widening of the public use language 
in the Takings Clause.353 
A. The Eminent Domain Cases 
Though the series of decisions in the Raiders litigation has 
been criticized for ignoring crucial aspects of takings analysis, it 
provides important precedent for future actions against 
professional sports franchises.354 Rather than engaging in a more 
traditional takings analysis, the final reviewing court mainly 
questioned “the propriety of using the dormant commerce clause 
as a limitation on an eminent domain action.”355 According to the 
Raiders IV court, its conclusion on the Commerce Clause issue 
obviated the need for further consideration of the City of 
Oakland’s public use argument.356  
Regardless of the result of the Raiders litigation, the series of 
court decisions provide some guidance concerning the public use 
issue.357 The Raiders I court found that the acquisition and 
operation of a professional sports franchise could qualify as an 
appropriate municipal function.358 Unequivocally, it indicated 
that the validity of the City of Oakland’s contemplated taking 
necessarily turned on its ability to demonstrate the Fifth 
                                                                                                     
 353.  See infra Part VI.B (considering modern franchise free agency in light 
of the Supreme Court’s arguable annihilation of the public use requirement). 
 354.  The Raiders IV court largely avoided the public use and just 
compensation issues before the court. See Greg L. Johnson, City of Oakland v. 
Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV): Commerce Clause Scrutiny as an End-Run 
Around Traditional Public Use Analysis, 1 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 360 (1987) (“The 
irony of all of the Raiders litigation is that the crucial, traditional, and 
fundamental points of taking analysis . . . received virtually no attention in 
comparison with other issues.”).  
 355.  See id. (“The appeals court did not attempt to justify its revolutionary 
approach, except to say that prior cases have simply never presented the issue 
as Raiders IV did.”). 
 356.  See Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (asserting 
that the conclusions reached on the Commerce Clause and antitrust issues 
outweighed any legitimate public use claims alleged by the City of Oakland). 
 357.  See supra Part II.A.1 (summarizing the Raiders litigation). 
 358.  See Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that, if the City 
of Oakland could demonstrate a valid public use, the acquisition and operation 
of the Raiders franchise would qualify as an appropriate municipal function). 
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Amendment’s public use requirement.359 In doing so, it extended 
the public use doctrine to “matters of public health, recreation 
and enjoyment.”360 The court articulated that the government’s 
ability to provide the public access to spectator sports is an 
appropriate municipal function.361 Additionally, even though the 
Raiders IV court invalidated the City of Oakland’s proposed 
action, different circumstances might have resulted in a different 
conclusion. The court implied that the exercise of eminent domain 
is appropriate where compelling state interests outweigh the 
burdens on interstate commerce.362 Unfortunately, the appellate 
courts in the Raiders cases never fully addressed the validity of 
the City of Oakland’s public use claims.363 
Though the City of Oakland did not prevail, its response 
provided a legitimate course of action for future victims of 
franchise free agency.364 Following the litigation, a professional 
sports franchise could no longer scoff at a city’s threat to exercise 
its eminent domain powers against the team’s tangible and 
intangible property rights.365 Based on the implications of the 
Raiders decisions, different circumstances and a showing of 
                                                                                                     
 359.  See id. (determining that, “[i]f such valid public use can be 
demonstrated, the statutes discussed herein afford City the power to acquire by 
eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use”). While the trial 
court addressed the public use issue on the final remand, the Raiders IV appeals 
court avoided the public use issue. See supra notes 60–63 (describing that the 
Raiders IV court invalidated the City of Oakland’s proposed action on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds). 
 360.  Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 841. 
 361.  See id. at 841–42 (utilizing the examples of stadiums owned and 
operated by municipalities, including Candlestick Park in San Francisco, to 
bolster the argument that providing access to recreation “in the form of 
spectator sports is an appropriate function of city government”). 
 362.  See id. (implying that more compelling reasons that justify the exercise 
of eminent domain include the promotion of health, safety, and fair economic 
competition). 
 363.  See, e.g., Raiders IV, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (“Our 
conclusion on the commerce clause obviates the need for further consideration of 
the public use and antitrust arguments.”). 
 364.  See Portner, supra note 39, at 549 (describing the influence of eminent 
domain on sports franchises following the initiation of the Raiders litigation). 
 365.  See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 553 n.2 (mentioning that a member of 
the Raider’s team counsel termed the City of Oakland’s efforts to acquire the 
team by eminent domain “a joke”). 
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public use could justify the condemnation of a professional sports 
franchise.366 
The Colts litigation focused on another set of eminent domain 
issues, but still provides valuable guidance for question of 
whether the seizure of a professional sports team’s trademark 
could constitute a public purpose.367 As discussed by the district 
court, the propriety of condemning a business is dependent upon 
the situs and jurisdictional reach of the government.368 Because 
the Colts franchise relocated the night before the Maryland 
legislature enacted the Emergency Bill No. 1042, the City of 
Baltimore lacked jurisdiction to seize the franchise.369 Similar to 
the Raiders IV court, the Maryland District Court also avoided 
the public use issue.370 Considering that the Colts prevailed on 
the threshold issue of the appropriate date for determining the 
situs of the franchise, it did not contemplate a thorough eminent 
domain analysis.371 
The Raiders and Colts cases support the proposition that the 
Public Use Clause could permit the seizure of a professional 
sports team’s trademark, contingent on the satisfaction of certain 
requirements.372 This is true regardless of the fact that the cities 
                                                                                                     
 366.  See Portner, supra note 39, at 548–51 (explaining the significance of the 
Raiders litigation and its influence on the expansion of the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment). 
 367.  See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text (summarizing the issues 
presented by the Colts litigation and their subsequent resolution by the 
Maryland District Court). 
 368.  See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Md. 1985) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that a sovereign 
state’s power to condemn property extends only as far as its borders and that 
the property to be taken must be within the state’s jurisdictional boundaries.”). 
 369.  See id. at 287 (finding that the City of Baltimore lacked the authority to 
seize the Colts franchise because the team relocated outside the state before the 
City initiated an eminent domain action). 
 370.  See id. (concluding that an eminent domain analysis was not required 
because the Colts “prevailed on the threshold issue of the appropriate date for 
determining the situs of the franchise”). 
 371.  See id. (stating that three consideration drove the court’s conclusion, 
including the fact that (1) the team’s principal place of business no longer in 
Maryland, (2) the team’s tangible property was located in Indianapolis before 
the March 30 filing, and (3) Irsay’s intentions for the Colts to escape Maryland’s 
jurisdiction). 
 372.  See, e.g., Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982) (finding that the 
seizure of a professional sports franchise could constitute an appropriate 
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of Oakland and Baltimore failed to stop their teams from 
relocating.373 They suggest that “the broad definition and the 
limited review applied to legislative determinations of public use 
indicate that the limitation is broad enough to encompass such a 
taking.”374 
B. Future Implications and Leveling the Playing Field 
A professional sports franchise’s trademarks operate to 
protect the proprietary interest in the team’s name, logo, and 
colors, but as a matter of public interest, this property-like right 
can be seized pursuant to a valid public use.375 The expansive 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement 
supports this claim.376 While the Midkiff and Kelo decisions 
received considerable attention and criticism, they affirmed the 
encompassing nature of public use.377 The government’s right to 
interfere with private property rights emerged in the early 
nineteenth century, coinciding with the nation’s economic 
growth.378 In many respects, the current, broad interpretation of 
public use represents years of state action and judicial 
precedent.379 
                                                                                                     
municipal function contingent on the demonstration of a valid public use). 
 373.  See Portner, supra note 39, at 548 (“A broad interpretation of the public 
use requirement in eminent domain law has also been applied where cities have 
used sports franchises to aid their economy.”). 
 374.  See Joyce, III, supra note 24, at 571 (applying the Public Use Clause to 
sports franchises). 
 375.  See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (commenting on the role 
played by trademarks in protecting a professional sports franchise’s brand). 
 376.  See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (describing that, in the 
years after the Midkiff decision, the Public Use Clause did not impose a 
significant impediment to state and local efforts to condemn private property). 
 377.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the Midkiff and Kelo cases, which 
clarified the broad and inclusive nature of the public use requirement). 
 378.  See Portner, supra note 39, at 542–44 (summarizing the historical 
background of the public use limitation). 
 379.  See id. at 542–51 (examining multiple decisions in eminent domain 
cases that demonstrate a willingness by state and federal courts to expand the 
definition of public use). 
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The fact that sports fans cheer for clothes sets the stage for 
disputes over valuable trademarks.380 Arguably, the name, logo, 
and colors associated with a professional sports franchise are the 
most important aspects of the team.381 The marks identify and 
promote a team’s products and services in commerce, and 
represent millions of dollars in value.382 Therefore, cities have a 
significant interest in preventing a team’s trademark from 
relocating, regardless of what happens to the franchise’s physical 
property.383 
The condemnation of a professional sports franchise’s 
trademark arguably serves the purpose of encouraging 
recreational and spectator activity, promoting civic identity, and 
protecting a substantial source of revenue.384 Given the Supreme 
Court’s deferential approach to legislative determinations of 
public use, such an argument theoretically satisfies the 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment.385 Therefore, while 
franchises may appear to hold most of the cards in relocation, the 
exercise of eminent domain power to obtain a relocating team’s 
trademark is a viable option for a city to protect its interests.386 If 
successful, cities could avoid a substantial loss of local identity 
and tradition by securing trademarks with significant financial, 
emotional, and functional value.387 
                                                                                                     
 380.  Recall Seinfeld’s explanation of why sports fans cheer for clothes. See 
supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (describing that a sports franchise’s 
clothes represent a particular brand, which symbolize a team’s home 
community). 
 381.  See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
intangible intellectual property interests associated with a professional sports 
franchise add substantial value and marketability). 
 382.  See Hetzel, supra note 8, at 142 (describing that, each year, sports team 
utilize their popularity to sell millions of dollars in products and services). 
 383.  See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing measures 
taken by the City of Cleveland to secure the Browns’ name and other 
trademarks following Art Modell’s announcement that the franchise would 
relocate to Baltimore, Maryland). 
 384.  See supra notes 6–16 and accompanying text (analyzing the value 
associated with a professional sports franchise’s trademarks). 
 385.  See supra Part III.A (illustrating the widening of the public use 
language in the Takings Clause). 
 386.  See supra Part VI.A (concluding that the exercise of eminent domain to 
seize a relocating team’s trademark could prevail considering the guidance 
provided by the courts in the Oakland Raiders and Baltimore Colts litigation). 
 387.  See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (explaining the attachment 
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VII. Conclusion 
The resurgence in franchise free agency in the NFL 
potentially implicates the loss of a significant source of local 
identity and tradition for multiple cities. Even if the City of St. 
Louis does not challenge the Rams’ relocation to Los Angeles, 
California, the NFL’s January 2016 vote permits the Chargers 
and Raiders franchises to move under certain circumstances. The 
relocation approval also sets the stage for a new generation of 
controversies over team property should a breakdown in 
negotiations occur. This includes disputes over valuable team 
logos and other trademarks. While courts ruled against the cities 
of Oakland and Baltimore nearly four decades ago, it is unclear 
whether another eminent domain action could succeed 
considering the expansive interpretation of the Public Use 
Clause. 
Theoretically, an action to seize a team’s trademarks could 
prevail. After all, trademarks embody, arguably, the most 
important aspect of a professional sports franchise—a brand that 
represents the team’s history and traditions, its host city, and its 
fans. This possibility remains regardless of the likely status of 
trademarks as constitutionally protected private property. 
Considering Supreme Court precedents and rulings of lower 
courts, it is clear that post-Kelo, the taking of a trademark in the 
professional sports franchise context could constitute a valid 
public use, contingent on the payment of just compensation. 
 
                                                                                                     
of fans to a sports team’s clothes). 
